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ABSTRACT—In the last two decades of the twentieth century, prisons 
throughout the United States witnessed a dramatic rise in the use of solitary 
confinement, and the practice continues to be widespread. From the latter 
part of the nineteenth century until the 1970s and ’80s, prolonged solitary 
confinement in the United States had fallen into disuse, as numerous 
observers and the United States Supreme Court recognized that the practice 
caused profound mental harm to prisoners. The reasons for this dramatic rise 
in the nationwide use of solitary confinement and the development of new 
supermax prisons have not been explored in depth. In particular, there has 
been little critical discussion of the rise of mass prolonged solitary as a 
product of the mass incarceration of the last several decades of the twentieth 
century. 
This Essay locates the rise of mass solitary in the 1980s in the context 
of mass incarceration. It explains the dramatic expansion of the use of 
solitary confinement and the construction of new super-maximum 
(supermax) prisons as an attempt by prison officials and politicians to 
maintain control of prisons in the face of increasingly radicalized, rebellious 
prisoners—often, but not exclusively, African-American—who had 
organized protests and disobedient conduct in American prisons from the 
1960s to the 1980s. The rise of solitary was connected to the use of mass 
incarceration as a form of social control. As society became more violent, so 
too did many prisons, but to view that violence as the underlying cause of 
the growth of supermax and other segregated confinement obscures the 
deeper, underlying causes of the rise of mass solitary. Those causes are 
linked to the rise of mass incarceration itself. Uncovering the history and 
causes of the dramatic rise in supermax prisons and the use of prolonged 
solitary confinement in the 1980s and ’90s is critical to understanding not 
only how we got to where we are, but how we can end this cruel and 
inhumane practice. 
The first Part of this Essay recounts the origins of the supermax prison 
at Marion Federal Penitentiary in the late 1970s and early 1980s and 
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demonstrates that the rise of mass solitary was more an official reaction to 
the need to control politically active and disruptive prisoners than to the 
violence narrative. The second Part explores prison officials’ need to reassert 
control over their prisoners and draws the parallels between the rise of both 
mass incarceration and mass solitary as a racialized mechanism of social 
control. The third Part introduces the preventive paradigm as a model to 
control prisoners and demonstrates that the concept of preventing future 
misconduct fueled both mass incarceration and the modern supermax, 
resulting in minimizing due process restraints and erroneously isolating 
thousands of people. Finally, the last Part analyzes the current reform 
movement and the alternatives that have been proffered and utilized to 
replace solitary, supermax confinement. The Essay concludes that prolonged 
solitary confinement can be abolished, and that prison officials have 
alternatives that can safely manage even very dangerous prisoners. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, prisons throughout the 
United States witnessed a dramatic rise in the use of solitary confinement, 
and the practice continues to be widespread. From the latter part of the 
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nineteenth century until the 1970s and ’80s, prolonged solitary confinement 
in the United States fell into disuse, as numerous observers recognized that 
the practice caused profound mental harm to prisoners.1 In 1890, the United 
States Supreme Court summarized the mental harm caused by solitary 
confinement, noting that “[a] considerable number of the prisoners fell . . . 
into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse 
them, and others became violently insane, others, still, committed suicide” 
and even “those who stood the ordeal better . . . in most cases did not recover 
sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.”2 
The era of large-scale isolation practiced in the early nineteenth century 
thus came to an end in the beginning of the twentieth century.3 Isolation was 
still used in American prisons, but typically as short-term punishment and 
on a much smaller scale.4 Even the harshest prison in the federal system, the 
infamous and widely criticized Alcatraz—which made no pretense of 
rehabilitation, employed no teachers, social workers, or psychologists, and 
severely limited contact with the outside world—nonetheless provided 
congregate work and recreational activities for most prisoners.5 While many 
 
 1 Charles Dickens visited the Cherry Hill, Pennsylvania prison in 1842 and reported: 
I believe that very few men are capable of estimating the immense amount of torture and agony 
which this dreadful punishment, prolonged for years, inflicts upon the sufferers . . . there is a depth 
of terrible endurance in it which none but the sufferers themselves can fathom, and which no man 
has a right to inflict upon his fellow-creature. I hold this slow and daily tampering with the 
mysteries of the brain, to be immeasurably worse than any torture of the body . . . . 
CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES 39 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1842). 
 Danish fairy tale author Hans Christian Andersen reported that a similar Pennsylvania-model prison 
in Sweden, which used solitary confinement, was “a well-built machine—a nightmare for the spirit.” 
HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, PICTURES OF SWEDEN 56 (London, Richard Bentley 1851). And the well-
known sociologist Alexis de Tocqueville and his colleague Gustav de Beaumont observed that a similar 
form of solitary confinement tried in Auburn, New York “proved fatal for the majority of the prisoners. 
It devours the victim incessantly and unmercifully; it does not reform, it kills. The unfortunate creatures 
submitted to this experiment wasted away . . . .” TORSTEN ERIKSSON, THE REFORMERS: AN HISTORICAL 
SURVEY OF PIONEER EXPERIMENTS IN THE TREATMENT OF CRIMINALS 49, 260 nn.9 & 10 (1976) (quoting 
GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DU SYSTÈME PÉNITENTIAIRE AUX ÉTATS-UNIS, 
ET DE SON APPLICATION EN FRANCE 13–14 (Paris, Fournier 1833)). For an alternate English translation, 
see GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 41 (Francis Lieber trans., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1964) 
(1833). 
 2 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890). 
 3 Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief History and 
Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 467 (2006). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See David A. Ward & Thomas G. Werlich, Alcatraz and Marion: Evaluating Super-Maximum 
Custody, 5 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 53, 55–56 (2003); see also Roy D. King, The Rise and Rise of 
Supermax: An American Solution in Search of a Problem?, 1 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 163, 166 (1999) 
(explaining that while Alcatraz was a strict institution intended to “break spirits,” the notoriously 
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state correctional systems designated certain prisons for the most violent 
prisoners, rarely did those prisons “operate[] on a total lockdown basis as 
normal routine.”6 Instead, prisons designated as maximum security 
“generally allowed movement, inmate interaction, congregate programs, and 
work opportunities.”7 
However, starting in 1972 with the creation of the control unit at the 
new United States Penitentiary at Marion, and escalating with Marion’s total 
lockdown and the construction of fifty-seven new super-maximum 
(supermax) prisons in the 1980s and 1990s,8 the model of incarcerating large 
numbers of prisoners in near total isolation from each other and the outside 
world proliferated. By the end of 1998, approximately 20,000 prisoners, or 
close to 2% of all prisoners serving a year or more in American prisons, were 
incarcerated in supermax prisons.9 In these supermax facilities, all prisoners 
were isolated in their cells twenty-three hours per day, with virtually no 
contact with other prisoners or staff, no programming, no congregate 
recreation, and no contact visits with family or friends.10 Moreover, the use 
of solitary units throughout the nation’s prisons dramatically expanded, with 
prison officials using a myriad of terms such as restrictive housing, 
disciplinary segregation, administrative segregation, and security housing 
units to denote the practice of solitary confinement.11 In 2000, the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics reported that approximately 80,000 people were confined 
in state or federal segregation units, and the data indicated that between 1995 
and 2000, “the growth rate in the number of prisoners housed in segregation 
 
draconian prison lacked many of the features of the modern supermax as prisoners were able to 
communicate between cells and permitted to recreate and work together). 
 6 CHASE RIVELAND, SUPERMAX PRISONS: OVERVIEW AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 5 (1999) 
(explaining the rise of the supermax prison in a report for the Department of Justice). 
 7 Id. 
 8 See King, supra note 5, at 167; Daniel P. Mears & Jamie Watson, Towards a Fair and Balanced 
Assessment of Supermax Prisons, 23 JUST. Q. 232, 232–33 (2006) (noting that as of 2006, there were at 
least fifty-seven supermax prisons in forty states that housed approximately 20,000 prisoners). 
 9 King, supra note 5, at 164. 
 10 Id. at 172; Mears & Watson, supra note 8, at 232, 234, 241. 
 11 Solitary confinement in the United States has been utilized to discipline prisoners for their 
misconduct while in prison, as an administrative measure to allegedly prevent future violence by 
prisoners, and in some cases, such as in certain state death rows, to segregate prisoners because of the 
crimes they have committed. In other countries, such as the Scandinavian countries, solitary confinement 
is also used in pretrial detention. See ACLU, A DEATH BEFORE DYING: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ON 
DEATH ROW 2, 4 (2013); Jules Lobel & Peter Scharff Smith, Solitary Confinement—From Extreme 
Isolation to Prison Reform, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: EFFECTS, PRACTICES, AND PATHWAYS TOWARD 
REFORM 1, 3–4 (Jules Lobel & Peter Scharff Smith eds., 2020) [hereinafter SOLITARY CONFINEMENT]. 
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far outpaced the growth rate of the overall prison population.”12 In 2014, a 
report by the Yale Law School Liman Center and the Association of State 
Correctional Administrators estimated that, as of 2014, approximately 
80,000 to 100,000 prisoners in state and federal prisons were in some form 
of restricted housing, defined as twenty-two to twenty-three hours per day 
isolated in their cells.13 
The reasons for this dramatic rise in the nationwide use of solitary 
confinement and the development of new supermax prisons have not been 
explored in depth. In particular, there has been little critical discussion of the 
rise of mass prolonged solitary as a product of the mass incarceration of the 
last several decades of the twentieth century.14 
The standard, simple explanation for the rebirth of mass solitary in 
American prisons is that it resulted from the significant rise in prison 
violence fueled in large part by the emergence of prison gangs, which 
seemed to leave prison officials with no alternative but to isolate the most 
dangerous, predatory prisoners.15 From this mainstream perspective, the rise 
of the supermax is tied to the same forces that brought about mass 
incarceration in that both the explosion of the prison population and the 
proliferation of supermax prisons were reactions to the rise in societal 
 
 12 COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AM.’S PRISONS, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, CONFRONTING 
CONFINEMENT 53 (2006), https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/confronting-
confinement/legacy_downloads/Confronting_Confinement.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BZT-8M7F]; see also 
Kevin Johnson, Commission Warns of Harm Isolation Can Do to Prisoners, USA TODAY, June 8, 2006, 
at 14A (reporting on the Commission’s findings). 
 13 THE LIMAN PROGRAM, YALE LAW SCH. & ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS, TIME-IN-CELL: THE 
ASCA-LIMAN 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON, at i, ii, 14–26 
(2015) [hereinafter TIME-IN-CELL], 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/time-in-cell_combined_-
web_august_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/45BN-TEAX]; see also ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, NCJ 249209, SPECIAL REPORT: USE OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN U.S. PRISONS AND JAILS, 
2011–12, at 1 (2015) (estimating that “[o]n an average day in 2011–12, up to 4.4% of state and federal 
inmates and 2.7% of jail inmates were held in administrative segregation or solitary confinement”).  
 14 Two notable exceptions to the lack of critical academic scholarship exploring the reasons behind 
the rise of prolonged solitary confinement are Professors Keramet Reiter and Marie Gottschalk. See 
KERAMET REITER, 23/7: PELICAN BAY PRISON AND THE RISE OF LONG-TERM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
(2016) [hereinafter REITER, 23/7] (exploring the reasons behind the rise of the Pelican Bay Prison Security 
Housing Unit); Keramet Reiter, The Rise of Supermax Imprisonment in the United States, in SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT, supra note 11, at 77, 77 (reviewing the origins of supermax prisons in Arizona and 
California and the role of litigation in shaping such institutions); Marie Gottschalk, Staying Alive: 
Reforming Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons and Jails, 125 YALE L.J.F. 253 (2016) (discussing the 
historic proliferation of solitary confinement and its current use). 
 15 See, e.g., King, supra note 5, at 176 (reporting on a survey of prison administrators that claimed 
that managing violent prisoners, particularly gang members, was the reason for the development of 
supermax housing). 
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violence. As Congressman Robert Kastenmeier argued in opening the 1985 
congressional hearings on the continued lockdown of prisoners in Marion, 
“[P]rison situations often mirror what is happening in society at-large.”16 The 
increase in violence in prison settings “is not dissimilar” to the violence 
taking place in society.17 So too, Norman Carlson, Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) in the 1970s and ’80s, testified before Congress 
that “[p]risons are microcosms of the larger society,” and that it is necessary 
to “isolate” those who resort to “violence, threats, and intimidation” from 
society.18 
However, recent critical scholarship has critiqued the mainstream 
perspective that the rise of mass incarceration in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century was simply a reaction to increasing crime and violence in 
American streets. Michelle Alexander, a leading critic of the mainstream 
narrative, has argued that “mass incarceration in the United States . . . 
emerged as a stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system of 
racialized social control that functions in a manner strikingly similar to Jim 
Crow.”19 Other critiques have also rejected the standard assertion that mass 
incarceration was simply a response to increased violence by pointing out 
the nature of the criminal justice system as a mechanism of social control 
and articulating other causes for the rise of mass imprisonment.20 While some 
of these writers do not ignore the clear fact that crime rates substantially rose 
in the latter part of the twentieth century,21 they explain the rise of mass 
incarceration as a reaction instead to the rise of the civil rights movement 
and the societal disruption and tumult of the 1960s and ’70s.22 So too, the 
 
 16 Marion Penitentiary—1985: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, 
& the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 2 (1985) [hereinafter Oversight 
Hearing] (opening statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 149 (statement of Norman Carlson, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons). 
 19 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 4 (2010). 
 20 See generally JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW 
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (explaining that prison growth has been driven primarily by increased 
felony-filing by prosecutors); Loïc Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass Incarceration: Rethinking the ‘Race 
Question’ in the U.S., 13 NEW LEFT REV. 41 (2002) (identifying the trajectory of racial domination in the 
United States and the need to bolster an eroding caste cleavage as the main impetus behind expansion of 
America’s penal system). 
 21 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 19, at 41; James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass 
Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 35 & nn.41 & 42 (2012) (pointing out 
that many scholars completely ignore the increasing violence, while some do mention it). 
 22 See generally TODD R. CLEAR & NATASHA A. FROST, THE PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE: THE RISE 
AND FAILURE OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2014) (concluding that the relentless punitive spirit 
115:159 (2020) Mass Solitary and Mass Incarceration 
165 
rise of mass solitary cannot simply be explained by an increase of violence 
in society or prisons. 
This Essay locates the rise of mass solitary in the 1980s in the context 
of mass incarceration. It explains the dramatic expansion of the use of 
solitary confinement and the construction of new supermax prisons as an 
attempt by prison officials and politicians to maintain control of prisons in 
the face of increasingly radicalized, rebellious prisoners—often, but not 
exclusively, African Americans—who had organized protests and 
disobedient conduct in American prisons from the 1960s to the 1980s. As 
Professor Judith Resnik has persuasively argued, solitary confinement 
cannot be viewed in isolation from the panoply of harsh prison policies that 
characterize modern prison management.23 This Essay expands that 
perspective to analyze how the rise of solitary was connected to the use of 
mass incarceration as a form of social control. As society became more 
violent, so too did many prisons, but to view that violence as the underlying 
cause of the growth of supermax and other segregated confinement obscures 
the deeper, underlying causes of the rise of mass solitary. Those causes are 
linked to the rise of mass incarceration itself. 
As an initial matter, prison officials responded to the growing political 
activism of the 1960s and ’70s, often led by radical African-American 
activists, by developing a mass, often racialized system of control in prisons. 
This trend in prisons ran parallel to the political use of mass imprisonment 
as a form of social control in reaction to the political movements and 
disturbances of that era.24 Second, one aspect of the prison population’s 
tremendous growth is the criminal justice system’s shift to a preventive 
 
ascendant in the United States from the 1960s to the early 2000s operated as the rationale for mass 
incarceration and, together with the co-alignment of an array of forces, gave rise to a type of social 
experiment in expanded social control coined “The Punishment Imperative”); ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND 
OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR (2016) (analyzing the criminal justice 
system as a method of social control for managing, punishing, and marginalizing a subset of the U.S. 
population because of their poverty status); PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS 
INCARCERATION (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds., 2007) (identifying numerous esoteric private and 
public industries and companies whose financial motivations coalesced to help cultivate and sustain mass 
imprisonment); Forman, Jr., supra note 21 (discussing the history of the New Jim Crow thesis and the 
author’s common ground and differences with the thesis). 
 23 Judith Resnik, Not Isolating Isolation, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, supra note 11, at 89, 89 
(“Solitary confinement is discretely troubling but reflective of the structure of U.S. prisons, which are 
organized to isolate people in a myriad of ways.”). 
 24 See, e.g., REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at 52–58 (discussing the powerful legacy of George Jackson 
in creating a “genuine fear” among California prison officials “that they were losing control of the 
prisons”); Resnik, supra note 23, at 90 (“[G]overnment officials used their fears of prisoners’ activism to 
impose hyper-confinement on hundreds of individuals; targeted were many individuals of the Muslim 
faith who understood their struggle to be part of an international human rights movement.”).  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
166 
model—in other words, a shift from punishing people for crimes they 
committed to punishing dangerousness, namely, locking people up for long 
periods of time to incapacitate them from committing crimes in the future 
and to deter others from committing offenses.25 Similarly, the rise of the 
supermax and prolonged solitary confinement was in part premised on a shift 
in the rationale for solitary—from a short-term, discrete punishment for 
alleged prisoner misbehavior in prison to lengthy, often indeterminate 
incapacitation and isolation of prisoners who were perceived to be dangerous 
as a preventive measure.26 Third, mass incarceration accelerated the 
overcrowding of many state prison systems, often resulting in worsening 
prison conditions and a subsequent rise of turmoil and violence in prisons.27 
These disturbances were then used as a justification for the creation of 
supermax prisons.28 Fourth, the same law-and-order political ideology based 
on punitiveness and symbolic toughness led to initiatives from politicians, 
rather than correctional officials, who sought political gain.29 
Uncovering the history and causes of the dramatic rise in supermax 
prisons and the use of prolonged solitary confinement in the 1980s and ’90s 
is critical to understanding not only how we got to where we are, but how 
we can end this cruel and inhumane practice.30 The rationale that prolonged 
 
 25 Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as 
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429 & n.1 (2001). 
 26 See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Preventive Detention: Prisoners, Suspected Terrorists and Permanent 
Emergency, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 389, 389 (2003). 
 27 See COMM. ON INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., SUPERMAX 
CONFINEMENT IN U.S. PRISONS 9 (2011) (“Supermax confinement became one method to address the 
problems resulting from this rapid increase in prison population.”); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, 
Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 
23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477, 491 (1997) (“[R]apid expansion of the nation’s prison 
population . . . has meant that most correctional systems are plagued by extreme overcrowding and the 
serious management and control problems that go with it. Many prison officials appear convinced that 
the turmoil brought about by increased population pressures can be managed by segregating and isolating 
prisoners whom they view as especially troublesome.”); see also Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 500–02 
(2011) (discussing problems associated with overcrowding). 
 28 See generally Keramet Reiter, The Path to Pelican Bay: The Origins of the Supermax Prison in 
the Shadow of the Law, 1982–1989, in CAGING BORDERS AND CARCERAL STATES 303, 303–32 (Robert 
T. Chase ed., 2019) (examining the development of the supermax prison in California in response to 
prison violence and the call to address the conditions caused by overcrowding); see also Austin v. 
Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722–25 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (describing the origins of Ohio supermax 
sparked by a 1993 riot in Ohio’s maximum-security prison, which did not have sufficient cells to house 
maximum-security prisoners). 
 29 RIVELAND, supra note 6, at 5; Leena Kurki & Norval Morris, The Purposes, Practices, and 
Problems of Supermax Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 385, 390–91 (2001). 
 30 See generally Sadie Dingfelder, Psychologist Testifies on the Risks of Solitary Confinement, AM. 
PSYCHOL. ASS’N, Oct. 2012, at 10 (reporting on Dr. Craig Haney’s testimony on solitary confinement’s 
“grave risk of psychological harm”); Haney & Lynch, supra note 27 (examining the history of solitary 
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solitary as the only way to manage very violent prisoners underlies both 
society’s and courts’ disposition to allow what seems obviously harmful31—
confining a person in a small cell; twenty-three hours per day for years; 
without any programming or physical contact with spouses, families, or 
friends; and with little exercise except in small individual cages or rooms. 
While the past decade has witnessed some reform of mass incarceration and 
increasing public, judicial, and correctional-official concern that solitary 
confinement has been overused and should be limited or ended,32 this reform 
spirit often does not address the problem of the seriously violent prisoner. 
Some critics of mass incarceration have recognized that we will never end 
mass incarceration until we face the problem of violence openly and 
honestly.33 So too, opponents of solitary confinement who have focused on 
advocating for particularly vulnerable populations34 or prisoners who present 
no serious security threat must confront the problem of what to do with the 
very violent prisoner. 
The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in Porter v. Clarke illustrates this 
problem.35 Reflecting the scientific consensus, the Fourth Circuit found that 
the placement of prisoners on Virginia’s death row in prolonged solitary 
confinement created a “‘substantial risk’ of serious psychological and 
emotional harm,” and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment. 36 
 
confinement and its case law in the United States to argue for its regulation); Smith, supra note 3 
(reviewing the history and literature on solitary confinement and the development of the supermax prison 
to demonstrate the substantial effects of long-term isolation); Kirsten Weir, Alone, in ‘The Hole,’ AM. 
PSYCHOL. ASS’N, May 2012, at 54 (reporting on the psychological effects of long-term solitary 
confinement). 
 31 As Judge Richard Posner put it, confinement in the “segregation unit involves considerable 
isolation, sometimes for protracted periods; and the record shows, what anyway seems pretty obvious, 
that isolating a human being from other human beings year after year or even month after month can 
cause substantial psychological damage.” Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1313 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 32 See TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 13, at 3, 4; Lobel & Smith, supra note 11, at 1. 
 33 DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND A ROAD TO 
REPAIR (2019); Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Reckoning with Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/03/opinion/violence-criminal-justice.html [https://perma.cc/9C3F-
3RL8]. 
 34 Particularly vulnerable populations include groups such as prisoners housed in solitary who are 
mentally ill, juveniles, and pregnant women. See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1267 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995) (holding that seriously mentally ill prisoners could not be held in isolation in the Pelican Bay 
Security Housing Unit); Anne Teigen & Sarah Brown, Rethinking Solitary Confinement for Juveniles, 
24 NCSL, no. 20, 2016, available at https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/rethinking-
solitary-confinement-for-juveniles.aspx [https://perma.cc/8Z7T-BZHT] (reporting that as of that date, 
“[n]ine states recently passed laws to limit or prohibit using solitary confinement for juvenile offenders”).  
 35 923 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that the imposition of prolonged solitary confinement 
violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 36 Id. at 361, 364. 
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Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred in 
disregarding the State’s argument that legitimate penological considerations 
justified the challenged conditions on death row. The court explained that 
had officials presented such legitimate reasons, which in Porter they did not, 
similar conditions of solitary could be upheld.37 For the Fourth Circuit, 
“prison officials tasked with the difficult task of operating a detention center 
may reasonably determine that prolonged solitary detention of the inmate is 
necessary to protect the well-being of prison employees, inmates, and the 
public or to serve some other legitimate penological objective.”38 Some 
courts have noted that the role “legitimate penological interests” plays in 
Eighth Amendment litigation has been confusing.39 Where prison officials 
knowingly deprive a prisoner of basic human needs, such as the need for 
human contact, no invocation of “legitimate penological reasons” should 
justify such a practice.40 Nonetheless, Justice Anthony Kennedy undoubtedly 
expressed a sentiment shared by other judges when he claimed that the issue 
in a judicial challenge to solitary confinement will be “whether workable 
alternative systems for long-term confinement exist.”41 
Uncovering the history of the rise of the supermax and debunking the 
myth that the supermax was simply a reaction to a rise of prisoner violence 
also demonstrate that at critical junctures, alternatives to the supermax did, 
in fact, exist. Nonetheless, the state and federal governments elected to 
ignore those alternatives. The recognition that alternatives to prolonged 
solitary confinement do exist, as states such as Colorado and North Dakota 
have now concluded,42 provides hope that this inhumane practice can and 
will be ended. 
The first Part of this Essay recounts the origins of the supermax prison 
at Marion Federal Penitentiary in the late 1970s and early 1980s and 
 
 37 Id. at 362–63. 
 38 Id. at 363. In a footnote, the court noted that the dissent’s view that the “opinion could ‘interfer[e]’ 
with prison officials’ ability to safely confine inmates housed at ‘the federal supermax prisons in Colorado 
and Illinois’ is without merit” because the majority’s decision permitted correctional officials to argue 
that the penological interest in protecting against violence would outweigh the serious harm to the 
prisoners of placing them in solitary confinement. Id. at 363 n.2. 
 39 Id. at 362 (“Notwithstanding the uncertain role of penological justification in conditions of 
confinement cases . . . .”); Grenning v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The precise 
role of legitimate penological interests is not entirely clear in the context of an Eighth Amendment 
challenge to conditions of confinement.”). 
 40 Jules Lobel, The Liman Report and Alternatives to Prolonged Solitary Confinement, 125 YALE 
L.J.F. 238, 240–43 (2016). 
 41 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 42 See Rick Raemisch, Colorado Ends Prolonged, Indeterminate Solitary Confinement, in SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT, supra note 11, at 311, 311–313; Leann K. Bertsch, Reflections on North Dakota’s 
Sustained Solitary Confinement Reform, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, supra note 11, at 325, 325. 
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demonstrates that the rise of mass solitary was more an official reaction to 
the need to control politically active and disruptive prisoners than to the 
violence narrative. The second Part explores prison officials’ need to reassert 
control over their prisoners and draws the parallels between the rise of both 
mass incarceration and mass solitary as a racialized mechanism of social 
control. The third Part introduces the preventive paradigm as a model to 
control prisoners and demonstrates that the concept of preventing future 
misconduct fueled both mass incarceration and the modern supermax, 
resulting in minimizing due process restraints and erroneously isolating 
thousands of people. Finally, the last Part analyzes the current reform 
movement and the alternatives that have been proffered and utilized to 
replace solitary, supermax confinement. The Essay concludes that prolonged 
solitary confinement can be abolished, and that prison officials have 
alternatives that can safely manage even very dangerous prisoners. 
I. THE VIOLENCE NARRATIVE AND THE RISE OF THE SUPERMAX 
A. The Violence Narrative 
The standard explanation for the rise of the supermax and prolonged 
solitary confinement in the 1980s and ’90s is that a significant rise in 
violence in American prisons, particularly fueled by the emergence of 
violent prison gangs, left prison officials with no alternative but to create 
supermax prisons that placed the most dangerous, predatory prisoners in 
high-security isolation. A survey conducted by the National Institute of 
Corrections in 1997 reported that all but one of the jurisdictions that replied 
claimed that the development of supermax housing was largely a response 
to the need for better methods of managing “violent and seriously disruptive 
inmates.”43 For many of these state administrators, the root of the violence 
came from the activities of gang members.44 As Human Rights Watch noted 
in its generally critical 1997 report on the Indiana supermax, 
The rationale behind supermax facilities and units is rather simple: in an era of 
rampant violence in many prisons, the segregation of dangerous inmates allows 
inmates in other facilities to serve their time with less fear of assault; the 
extreme limitations on inmates’ freedom in such facilities protects both staff 
 
 43 NAT’L INST. OF CORR., SUPERMAX HOUSING: A SURVEY OF CURRENT PRACTICE 3 (1997) 
[hereinafter SUPERMAX HOUSING]. 
 44 Id. 
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and inmates; and the harshness of supermax conditions is believed to deter other 
prisoners from committing acts that might result in their transfer there.45 
So too, the then-Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Norman 
Carlson, testified before Congress that the institution of a prison-wide 
lockdown at Marion in the 1980s was “the only answer we have at present” 
for preventing violence by a small number of individuals in prison, and that 
the lockdown had successfully reduced violence throughout the federal 
system.46 
The Seventh Circuit’s unanimous decision in Bruscino v. Carlson47 is 
typical of judicial decisions in the 1980s and ’90s dealing with the rise of 
mass solitary.48 The court in Bruscino rejected the Marion prisoners’ claims 
that prolonged isolation resulting from the permanent lockdown violated the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.49 Judge 
Richard Posner, writing for the court, recognized that conditions involved in 
the Marion lockdown were “depressing in the extreme,” and for prisoners 
“[t]o live under such conditions [was] sordid and horrible.”50 Nonetheless, 
the court held that while the “conditions in Marion deserve careful 
scrutiny . . . they must be evaluated against the background of an 
extraordinary history of inmate violence” and that “[t]he defendants placed 
in the record a remarkable narrative of the violence that led up to the 
lockdown.”51 After recounting in detail the violence at Marion preceding the 
lockdown, which included the murder of two guards and a number of 
inmates, the court noted that “[i]f order could be maintained in Marion 
without resort to the harsh methods attacked in this lawsuit, the plaintiffs 
 
 45 JAMIE FELLNER & JOANNE MARINER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLD STORAGE: SUPER-
MAXIMUM SECURITY CONFINEMENT IN INDIANA (1997), 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1997/usind/ [https://perma.cc/5MK2-XSMX]. 
 46 Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 142–43 (statement of Norman Carlson, Director, Federal 
Bureau of Prisons). 
 47 854 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 48 See, e.g., Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1259 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that lockdown did not 
violate Eighth Amendment because it was necessary to contain violence); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 
1146, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that indeterminate solitary confinement in Pelican Bay SHU does 
not violate Eighth Amendment for those prisoners who are not seriously mentally ill). 
 49 854 F.2d at 166. 
 50 Id. at 164, 166. The magistrate judge and district court also rejected as not credible the testimony 
of numerous prisoners who testified to beatings and other mistreatment and brutality by correctional 
officials during the lockdown. Bruscino v. Carlson, 654 F. Supp. 609, 613–14 (S.D. Ill. 1987). The court 
of appeals affirmed this part of the ruling, noting that evidence of the beatings consisted of testimony by 
inmates “who frequently lie in prisoner rights’ cases,” and that the court was unwilling in any event to 
disturb the findings of the magistrate and district court judges. Bruscino, 854 F.2d at 166–67. 
 51 Id. at 164–65. 
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would have a stronger argument that the methods were indeed cruel and 
unusual punishments.”52 
While the court’s suggestion—whether a prison condition (or set of 
conditions) constitutes torture versus a permissible reaction to prison 
violence is dependent on whether there are any alternatives—seems wrong 
as a matter of law, as a practical matter the potential alternatives to the state’s 
cruel policies loom large in a judge’s decision on an Eighth Amendment 
claim.53 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Wilkinson v. Austin held that the 
process due to prisoners prior to placement in the Ohio supermax had to be 
measured against “[p]rison security, imperiled by the brutal reality of prison 
gangs,” which “provides the backdrop of the State’s interest.”54 For Justice 
Kennedy and the unanimous Court, the brutality of gangs and their 
uncontrollability by normal means meant that “[p]rolonged confinement in 
[s]upermax may be the State’s only option for the control of some inmates.”55 
The history of the development of control units and supermaxes, 
however, demonstrates that the impetus for the establishment of these units 
was often not uncontrollable violence amongst gang members or 
pathological murderers in prisons. Rather, the crackdown occurred as a 
response to political activism amongst prisoners who disturbed the normal 
routine of the prison and threatened the control of prison officials. Even 
where political activism was accompanied by violence or hostage-taking, 
prisoner actions were often provoked by ignored grievances and demands to 
reform prison conditions or end racial discrimination.56 Moreover, prison 
officials themselves often perpetrated the bulk of the violence as retribution 
for the prisoners’ activities.57 
 
 52 Id. at 165. 
 53 See Lobel, supra note 40, at 239–40 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s focus on workable alternatives 
and cases in which courts have affirmed long-term solitary confinement for prisoners deemed particularly 
violent). 
 54 545 U.S. 209, 227 (2005). 
 55 Id. at 229. 
 56 See generally STAUGHTON LYND, LUCASVILLE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF A PRISON UPRISING (2d 
ed. 2011) (providing a history of the Ohio Lucasville prison riot as a response to the increasing repression 
and discrimination by prison officials and their failure to respond to prisoner grievances); HEATHER ANN 
THOMPSON, BLOOD IN THE WATER: THE ATTICA PRISON UPRISING OF 1971 AND ITS LEGACY (2016) 
(discussing the violent events at Attica in response to the repression and racial discrimination at the prison 
which were ignored by prison officials despite prisoner grievances and attempts to address the issues 
peacefully). 
 57 See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 56 (reviewing the events of Attica in 1971 and its aftermath and 
demonstrating the disproportionate and unnecessary violence perpetrated by prison officials in ending the 
prison uprising); see also Tom Puleo, Guards’ Beatings of Inmates After Riots Happens in Many Prisons, 
HARTFORD COURANT (June 27, 1993), https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-xpm-1993-06-27-
0000100193-story.html [https://perma.cc/6GGA-BKVP]. 
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B. Marion and the Creation of the Modern Supermax 
The creation of the control unit and the institution of the permanent 
lockdown at Marion are often thought of as the precursor and inspiration of 
the modern supermax, as state prison officials copied what was then called 
the “Marion Model.”58 The story of the Marion control unit’s development 
is illustrative of the supermax as a response mainly to disruptive and 
rebellious prisoners, not necessarily the most violent. 
Marion opened in 1963 and was designed to hold 525 “adult male felons 
who are difficult to manage and control.”59 Marion’s control unit, featuring 
prolonged solitary confinement, was created in 1972, but not in response to 
escalating prisoner violence.60 Rather, the first group of prisoners placed in 
solitary confinement at the control unit were prisoners engaged in a 
nonviolent work stoppage to protest a guard’s beating of a Mexican 
prisoner.61 In response to the work stoppage, prison officials created what 
was at that time termed the control unit, and later designated the “Long-Term 
Control Unit,” thus coining the term “control unit.”62 
The Unit’s origins lay in a behavioral modification program, termed the 
Control and Rehabilitation Effort (CARE), begun at Marion in 1968 and used 
on prisoners in solitary confinement.63 The program’s purpose was to bring 
prisoners under staff control, not only physically but psychologically, and it 
was a key component in the establishment of the control unit in 1972.64 
 
 58 Ward & Werlich, supra note 5, at 59 (“[Bruscino v. Carlson] gave legitimacy to what came to be 
called the ‘Marion Model’. When state prison wardens visited and observed the unprecedented degree of 
control the Marion staff had over prisoners, several commented that they ‘had died and gone to heaven.’”).  
 59 American Prisons in Turmoil (Part 1): Hearings Before the H.R. Select Comm. on Crime , 92d 
Cong. 277 (1972) (statement of George Pickett, Superintendent, Federal Prison, Marion, Ill.); JESSICA 
MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT: THE PRISON BUSINESS 181 (1973). 
 60 COMM. TO END THE MARION LOCKDOWN, FROM ALCATRAZ TO MARION TO FLORENCE: CONTROL 
UNIT PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1992), 
https://www.freedomarchives.org/Documents/Finder/DOC3_scans/3.alcatraz.marion.florence.1992.htm
l [https://perma.cc/SV2W-FR44] [hereinafter FROM ALCATRAZ TO MARION TO FLORENCE]; Bonnie 
Kerness & Jamie Bissonette Lewey, Race and the Politics of Isolation in U.S. Prisons, 22 ATLANTIC J. 
COMM. 21, 28 (2014). 
 61 FROM ALCATRAZ TO MARION TO FLORENCE, supra note 60, at 2. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. The control unit received its first inmates “with a mission which called for a programme of 
behaviour modification ‘designed to assist the individual in changing his attitude and behavior.’” King, 
supra note 5, at 167. 
 64 See MITFORD, supra note 59, at 134–35; FROM ALCATRAZ TO MARION TO FLORENCE, supra note 
60, at 2–3. 
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As recounted by the Seventh Circuit in a class action lawsuit, the facts 
of the work stoppage and resulting establishment of the control unit were as 
follows: 
Appellants were segregated after a general work stoppage on July 17, 1972. The 
disruption was in violation of prison rules requiring labor of all able-bodied 
inmates. To thwart the stoppage, Marion officials first confined the entire prison 
population to their cells. Most inmates were released six days later, on July 24, 
after seven inmates suspected to be prominent instigators of the mutiny were 
relegated to segregation, along with ten supporters insistent upon 
accompanying them. Work apparently resumed as normal for only a short time 
thereafter. On the afternoon of July 25, a disturbance again put a halt to regular 
prison activity. Taking no chances with simply isolating the ringleaders, the 
Marion administration undertook widespread segregation of inmates suspected 
of insubordination; approximately eighty-six more prisoners were removed 
from the general population.65 
As the district court found, “In all approximately 103 men were placed in 
segregation as a result of their participation in the work stoppages.”66 
District court Judge James Foreman denied plaintiffs’ motion for 
injunctive relief, finding that the prison officials had not violated plaintiffs’ 
due process or Eighth Amendment rights because they had been forced to 
deal with an “unusual situation” of a major disruption of prison life, and 
“[p]rompt and effective action . . . was required to restore the prison to 
normalcy.”67 The court of appeals reversed, finding that these prisoners had 
been found guilty of disciplinary rule infractions without being accorded due 
process, and remanded to the district court to determine whether their 
punishment of long-term, indefinite detention in the control unit was 
disproportionate and thus violative of the Eighth Amendment.68 As the court 
of appeals noted, “For a single such event [of misconduct], segregation does 
not and should not exceed a few months, if that long.”69 
On remand, the district court addressed the Eighth Amendment claims 
of thirty-six prisoners still in the control unit after being accorded hearings 
which complied with due process requirements, and determined that the 
defendants had not introduced any evidence that any of these prisoners had 
committed a serious infraction aside from participating in the 1972 prison 
 
 65 Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 621–22 (7th Cir. 1973). 
 66 Adams v. Carlson, 352 F. Supp. 882, 886–87 (E.D. Ill. 1973). 
 67 Id. at 885–86. 
 68 Adams, 488 F.2d at 629, 636. 
 69 Id. at 628. 
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work stoppage.70 The court held that “punishing the Plaintiffs by placing 
them in confinement under the very restrictive conditions imposed . . . for a 
period of sixteen months constitutes punishment disproportionate to the 
various offenses with which these Plaintiffs have been charged and, 
consequently, is violative of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment.”71 The court ordered their release from the 
control unit to General Population.72 The use of the Eighth Amendment 
disproportionality analysis to challenge prisoners’ prolonged solitary 
confinement was unprecedented and had the potential to significantly limit 
prison officials’ use of such confinement.73 
Thus, in repudiating the prison officials’ rationale, the courts 
recognized that one of the first large-scale long-term control units was not 
designed to hold violent prisoners, but rather those prisoners who disrupted 
prison’s normal routine, even where they did so in a nonviolent manner.74 
Regaining control of the prison from disruptive activists—not necessarily 
curbing violence—was the control unit’s original focus. 
The judiciary’s rejection of confining prisoners for the extended term 
in the control unit on the charge of instigating or participating in a labor 
stoppage helped drive the BOP’s decision to tighten the controls at Marion’s 
General Population and to change the prison’s purpose into one of 
segregating dangerous or disruptive prisoners.75 This tightening of controls 
resulted in numerous prisoners again being sent to the control unit in the mid-
1970s. The only difference was that this time prisoners were not assigned to 
 
 70 Adams, 368 F. Supp. at 1053. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 1053–54. 
 73 Michael Deutsch, The Road from Attica: Mass Incarceration and the Emergence of Control Unit 
Prisons 10 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with journal); see also Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth 
Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement Litigation Benefit from Proportionality Theory? , 
36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53, 55–56 (2009) (noting the dissonance between the use of disproportionality 
Eighth Amendment theory in sentencing and its absence in conditions of confinement jurisprudence and 
arguing for its potential use in challenging solitary confinement). 
 74 The purpose of the control unit was officially described by the BOP as “to separate those offenders 
whose behavior seriously disrupted the orderly operation of an institution from the vast majority of 
offenders who wish to participate in regular institutional programs.” DAVID A. WARD & ALLEN F. BREED, 
THE UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY, MARION, ILLINOIS: A REPORT TO THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1984), reprinted in Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 9, 10 (1985) 
(citing Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement, 5212.1, June 1973). Interestingly, the control unit’s original 
purpose said nothing about protecting prisoners and staff from violence. 
 75 Deutsch, supra note 73; Telephone Interview with Michael Deutsch, lead counsel in Adams v. 
Carlson (Sept. 26, 2019). David Ward and Alan Breed state that the new classification system and the 
changed purpose of Marion had to do with increasing acts of violence and gang activity throughout the 
federal system in the late 1970s. WARD & BREED, supra note 74, at 10–11. 
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the control unit for disciplinary infractions, which the courts had rejected, 
but as a so-called administrative, preventive measure. Marion officials 
claimed that disruptive prisoners were not being punished for specific acts—
for which they would have to be found guilty of misconduct at a disciplinary 
hearing and subjected to proportionate punishment—but were rather 
classified to indefinite administrative segregation for being unable “to adjust 
to an open institutional setting.”76 The officials dubbed the harsh segregation 
imposed on the prisoners as a “special treatment program,” and the control 
unit was termed the “Control Unit Treatment Program.”77 
Again, the prisoners resorted to court action. In Bono v. Saxbe, the 
prisoner class alleged substantive and procedural due process violations in 
their placement in the control unit, as well as an Eighth Amendment 
challenge to the conditions in the unit, which now included 23.5 hours per 
day in the cell, no group programming, handcuffing prisoners whenever they 
left their cells except during showers and recreation, subjecting them to 
humiliating rectal searches, and denying them any contact visits with family 
or friends.78 The control unit included cells in one wing with solid steel doors 
which were termed “boxcar” cells.79 Several prisoners had committed suicide 
in these harsh, isolating conditions, and prisoners had been confined there 
because they were activists, critics, jailhouse lawyers, or had influence over 
other prison activists.80 The named plaintiff, Victor Bono, was “a writer, 
artist, and well-respected long term prisoner” who posed no threat to other 
prisoners and was only in the control unit due to the two murders that had 
landed him in prison years before.81 
Judge Foreman generally rejected the plaintiffs’ claims and denied 
injunctive relief, primarily because he found that use of the control unit to 
“prevent future disruptions within the institution” was rational and did not 
constitute punishment.82 Nonetheless, the court found that in some cases, 
allowing prison officials to place prisoners in the control unit when they 
engaged in the “disruption of the orderly operation of a prison” let officials 
silence “prison critics,” “religious leaders,” and “economical and 
philosophical dissidents.” Oftentimes, “no showing was made as to how 
 
 76 Bono v. Saxbe, 450 F. Supp. 934, 941 (E.D. Ill. 1978), supplemented by 462 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. 
Ill. 1978); see also Deutsch, supra note 73, at 13. 
 77 Deutsch, supra note 73, at 13. 
 78 450 F. Supp. at 938–40, 946. 
 79 Id. at 946. 
 80 Deutsch, supra note 73, at 13–15. 
 81 Id. at 15. 
 82 Bono, 450 F. Supp. at 944. 
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these persons disrupted the orderly running of the institution.”83 The court 
also found that placing prisoners in the control unit solely on the basis of the 
crime for which they were convicted violated due process because “no 
reasonable prediction of an inmate’s behavior in the prison could be based 
on the crime for which he was convicted,” nor could an inmate be “punished” 
for a specific offense by being placed in the control unit, as bypassing the 
inmate discipline procedure violated BOP policy.84 The court ordered new 
hearings for all the prisoners in the control unit.85 It also found that the use 
of “boxcar” cells, with solid steel fronts—a feature that later was to become 
standard at supermaxes86—constituted cruel and unusual punishment and 
enjoined their use.87 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision that placing 
prisoners in the control unit did not violate the Eighth Amendment, finding 
that “when the Control Unit is used as a preventive measure, the decision to 
place a prisoner there is not a violation of substantive due process or of the 
Eighth Amendment.”88 What clearly motivated both the district court and 
court of appeals was not merely controlling dangerously violent prisoners, 
but also that prison officials “have an obligation to society in general to keep 
prisons operating in an orderly manner, and segregation of those who disrupt 
these institutions is a reasonable way to meet this obligation.”89 The threat of 
prison disruption, work stoppages, and other collective action, which the 
district court in Adams v. Carlton termed akin to “an outright mutiny,”90 was 
at that point driving the creation of the control unit and the tightening of 
conditions at Marion generally. 
In 1979, before major violence broke out at Marion, a Task Force of the 
Bureau of Prisons recommended that the entire Marion prison be made into 
a modified control unit.91 Action on that recommendation was deferred, at 
least in part because the BOP authorities were concerned about its legality 
and that such action would fare badly in federal court.92 However, in 1979, 
the BOP did add a new, higher security classification to its system, reserving 
 
 83 Id. at 943. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See, e.g., Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 724 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (describing cells at 
Ohio supermax as having “solid metal door[s]”). 
 87 Bono, 450 F. Supp. at 937, 947. 
 88 Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1980) (emphasis omitted). 
 89 Id. at 616. 
 90 352 F. Supp. 882, 885–86 (E.D. Ill. 1973). 
 91 See WARD & BREED, supra note 74, at 11. 
 92 Telephone Interview with David A. Ward, former Professor, Univ. of Minn. (Oct. 1, 2019). 
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Level 6 (Marion) for “all violent, assaultive, and . . . disruptive inmates.”93 
Prison officials within Marion were also considering a general lockdown 
before the outbreak of major violence there, and thus implemented stricter 
controls. 
Prisoners responded to stricter conditions with several major work 
stoppages in the early 1980s which eventually led prison officials to close 
the industrial work program at Marion and transfer the machinery used to 
another prison.94 In 1983, after several brutal murders and a dramatic 
increase in violence at Marion, the entire prison was placed on lockdown 
status, where prisoners were held in solitary confinement.95 The lockdown 
continued on a permanent basis, and, as recounted earlier, was eventually 
upheld by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Bruscino v. Carlson as a 
rational reaction to the extreme violence at Marion in 1983.96 
The Marion experience, which laid the foundation for increased use of 
prolonged solitary confinement in the 1980s and ’90s, undermines the view 
that the rise of mass solitary in the form of control units and supermaxes was 
simply a response to increasing violence in prisons. Instead, the control unit 
developed in response to political, nonviolent disturbances, such as protests 
against guard abuses or prisoner grievances. The change in Marion’s 
character from a general population prison to a solitary confinement unit had 
been planned even before the spate of violence in 1983 which purportedly 
made the BOP institute the lockdown, leading to suspicions that, as the 
American Civil Liberties Union put it in congressional testimony, the Bureau 
was using the murders at Marion as a “pretext to further change the character 
of Marion.”97 Moreover, the BOP used Marion to isolate prisoners who had 
not necessarily proven to be violent in prisons, but who were political 
radicals or revolutionaries.98 As Marion Warden Ralph Aron testified in 
 
 93 WARD & BREED, supra note 74, at 10–11. 
 94 Id. at 12. 
 95 Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 164 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 62–63 (Executive Summary of the ACLU National Prison 
Project Testimony, June 26, 1985, in the Subcomm. on the Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of 
Justice). 
 98 For example, Leonard Peltier, the American Indian Movement leader, Sekou Odinga, member of 
the Black Liberation Army, Alan Berkman, a former doctor who was a medium-security prisoner with no 
history of violence in prison but a political radical, Sundiata Acoli, Black Panther/Black Liberation Army 
member, Ray Levasseur, a white political radical, Puerto Rican Nationalists, and other activists such as 
Oscar López Rivera, Rafael Cancel Miranda, Kojo Grailing Brown, and Tim Blunk were all transferred 
to Marion despite having no history of violence in prison. NANCY KURSHAN, OUT OF CONTROL: A 
FIFTEEN-YEAR BATTLE AGAINST CONTROL UNIT PRISONS, at viii, xi, 39, 133, 183–84 (2013); THE NAT’L 
COMM. TO FREE PUERTO RICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS & POWS & THE COMM. TO END THE MARION 
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1975, “The purpose of the Marion control unit [was] to control revolutionary 
attitudes in the prison system and the society at large.”99 
II. SUPERMAX AND CONTROL OF DISRUPTIVE OR  
REBELLIOUS PRISONERS 
The spate of prison work stoppages and other collective protests was 
not confined to Marion.100 Prisons are a microcosm of society, and the 
increasingly rebellious civil rights movement, along with other political and 
social movements of the ’60s and ’70s, spilled over into prisons.101 That era 
witnessed a wave of prison protests. These were often labor protests, but 
generally had a “broader vision,” with prisoners protesting “against a host of 
inequities and dehumanizing aspects of their imprisonment.”102 Those strikes 
and protests were influenced by civil rights movements, and they helped 
create a prisoners’ rights movement that continues to this day.103 Prisoners 
 
LOCKDOWN, MASS INCARCERATION AND CONTROL UNITS: CRIME CONTROL OR SOCIAL CONTROL? 6–
16 (1995), 
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95.pdf [https://perma.cc/23A4-BKAR]; FROM ALCATRAZ TO MARION TO FLORENCE, supra note 60, at 2. 
 99 Steve Whitman, The Marion Penitentiary: It Should Be Opened up, not Locked Down, SOUTHERN 
ILLINOSIAN, Aug. 7, 1988, at D25; see also Alan Eladio Gómez, Resisting Living Death at Marion 
Federal Penitentiary, 1972, 96 RADICAL HIST. REV. 58, 61, 80 n.10 (2006) (citing testimony in Bono v. 
Saxbe, 462 F. Supp. 146 (7th Cir. 1978)); E-mail from Michael Deutsch, lead counsel in Bono v. Saxbe, 
to author (Oct. 31, 2019) (on file with journal). 
 100 See Note, Striking the Right Balance: Toward a Better Understanding of Prison Strikes , 
132 HARV. L. REV. 1490, 1497–1500 (2019) [hereinafter Striking the Right Balance]; see also Gómez, 
supra note 99, at 65 (prisoners’ struggle emerged strongest in early 1970s). 
 101 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 2 (opening statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier, 
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice); id. at 149 (statement of 
Norman Carlson, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons); see also LARRY SIEGEL & CLEMENS BARTOLLAS, 
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it is a distorted image of that society. In its analysis of the 1971 Attica Prison rebellion, the New York 
State Special Commission on Attica stated, ‘While it is a microcosm reflecting the forces and emotions 
of the larger society, the prison actually magnifies and intensifies these forces, because it is so 
enclosed.’”); Interview by Jonah Walters with Heather Ann Thompson, Professor, Univ. of Mich., 
available at https://jacobinmag.com/2020/04/prisons-coronavirus-pandemic-heather-ann-thompson/ 
[https://perma.cc/FD24-FD6W] (“Prisons really are microcosms of the broader society.”). 
 102 Striking the Right Balance, supra note 100, at 1498–99. 
 103 See, e.g., ERIC CUMMINS, THE RISE AND FALL OF CALIFORNIA’S RADICAL PRISON MOVEMENT 
126–27 (1994) (discussing the organizing of California’s prison movement and the influence of the 
radical political movement in California); Striking the Right Balance, supra note 100, at 1499–1500. 
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sought in many cases to organize unions.104 The increasing influence of Black 
Muslim—and later Black Panther—protests were signs of a “wider 
discontent among inmates.”105 And often, prisoners’ discontent resulted not 
only in work stoppages but in riots when their grievances were ignored or 
inadequately addressed. More than 300 prison riots occurred across the 
United States between 1971 and 1986.106 
The establishment of the control unit at Marion followed shortly after 
the riot and the brutal retaking of the prison at Attica in 1971, as well as 
revolutionary African-American prisoner George Jackson’s killing by prison 
guards several weeks earlier in California.107 As Professor Keramet Reiter 
recounts, prison guards and wardens, such as Carl Larson of California, 
believed that the civil rights and social justice movement outside of prisons 
aligned with a Black-led, revolutionary, and violent movement inside 
prisons. As Larson describes, 
We had this ‘revolution,’ and it manifested itself with a lot of rhetoric . . . and 
thought. [But] in the prisons, it manifested in a lot of violence . . . The Black 
Guerilla Family and the Black Panthers, they had a political side . . . but they 
were mostly gangs, mafia.108  
For Larson and other prison officials, the “national revolutionary movement 
that culminated with George Jackson” was critical to the understanding of 
why California built its supermax and the BOP created the Marion Control 
Unit.109 The “Angola Three” case, where three Black Panther members were 
placed in solitary for what would be decades based on their political 
ideology, is another illustration of prison officials reacting to the black 
revolutionary movement—irrespective of violence—to place radicals and 
activists in solitary.110 
 
 104 CUMMINS, supra note 103, at 252–53 (recounting how in the mid-1970s, the California Prisoners’ 
Union came close to recognition); see also Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 121 
(1977) (rejecting claims by prisoners to be allowed to organize unions and have union meetings).  
 105 CUMMINS, supra note 103, at 79; see generally DAN BERGER, CAPTIVE NATION: BLACK PRISON 
ORGANIZING IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2014) (discussing the influence of Black Muslims and Black 
Panthers in Black prison organizing). 
 106 REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at 57; see also BERT USEEM & PETER KIMBALL, STATES OF SIEGE: 
U.S. PRISON RIOTS, 1971–1986, at 3 (1991). 
 107 See REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at 45–51 (recounting the details of Jackson’s alleged attempted 
escape with a gun and the bloody aftermath that followed). For a thorough review of the Attica events, 
see THOMPSON, supra note 56. 
 108 REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at 40. 
 109 See id. at 52; see also supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing view of Marion warden 
that solitary was designed to curb revolutionary ideas and movements). 
 110 See ROBERT HILLARY KING, FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE HEAP: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BLACK 
PANTHER ROBERT HILLARY KING 21 (2009). See generally ALBERT WOODFOX WITH LESLIE GEORGE, 
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That control of collective activity and radical thought has been a 
primary goal of supermax confinement is illustrated by officials’ often 
punitive reaction to hunger strikes and other forms of nonviolent protest and 
statements by prisoners. In 2012, when California Security Housing Unit 
(SHU) prisoners engaged in nonviolent hunger strikes as what they felt was 
the only method left to publicize their prolonged solitary confinement after 
grievances and lawsuits had failed, California prison officials punished them 
through disciplinary proceedings for participating in or leading the strike. 111 
In 2012, prisoner representatives from different ethnic groups signed on to 
an Agreement to End Hostilities between the different racial groups that 
make up the California prison system in a collective effort to end the racial 
violence that had beset the California prisons for decades.112 In response, 
California officials stated in the Ashker v. Brown litigation that the 
Agreement was evidence of the continuing threat to prison security posed by 
the plaintiffs in that it showed the “influence” they had over other prisoners 
in the prisons.113 Breaking the control and influence of these leaders was 
paramount to prison officials, even though the leaders’ influence was being 
used to put an end to racial violence in California prisons.114 
Moreover, prison officials were beset by increasing litigation, both 
from civil rights lawyers and from prisoners themselves, which began to 
place significant restrictions on what had been the virtually absolute 
discretion of officials to manage prisoners.115 Just as civil rights protests and 
 
SOLITARY (2019) (recounting his experience serving four decades in solitary confinement as one of the 
Angola 3); ANGOLA 3: BLACK PANTHERS AND THE LAST SLAVE PLANTATION (Obstacle Illusions 2008) 
(recounting the story of the Angola 3 and their record stay in solitary confinement); IN THE LAND OF THE 
FREE . . . (The Mob Film Company 2010) (same). 
 111 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at ⁋⁋ 157, 164, Ashker v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012). 
 112 PELICAN BAY STATE PRISON-SECURITY HOUSING UNIT SHORT CORRIDOR HUNGER STRIKE 
REPRESENTATIVES, AGREEMENT TO END HOSTILITIES (2012), 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/Agreement%20to%20End%20Hostilities.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7H6U-BNG5] [hereinafter AGREEMENT TO END HOSTILITIES]. 
 113 Defendants’ Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, or 
Alternatively, to Stay; Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 2 & n.1, Ruiz v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-
05796-CW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2012). 
 114 While it is possible to argue that the Agreement did demonstrate the influence that the leaders of 
the hunger strikes had in the California prisons and that such influence could be used for negative 
purposes, the point is that the Agreement had as its objective an incredibly positive goal—namely ending 
the ethnic violence in California prisons. California ignored that goal because it was so focused on 
breaking these leaders’ influence over other prisoners. See AGREEMENT TO END HOSTILITIES, supra note 
112. 
 115 See CUMMINS, supra note 103, at 80–82 (explaining how the enormous flood of habeas petitions 
from California state prisoners left prison officials unsure how to respond); MALCOLM M. FEELEY & 
EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED 
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litigation were legally dismantling Jim Crow, the combination of prison 
protests and litigation was eliminating the “Plantation Model” which had 
been ensconced in southern prisons until the 1970s, and more generally 
limiting the ability officials had to punish and control prisoners.116 
An increase in collective prison action in the 1970s and 1980s, 
combined with an increase in successful prisoner litigation, determinate 
sentencing reforms, and the rise of prison gangs during this period led 
officials to conclude their prisons were out of control and they had lost their 
traditional management tools.117 As Professor Reiter points out in discussing 
California prisons: “California prison officials seemed to be losing both their 
autonomy to run their prisons free from public scrutiny and their discretion 
over the intensity and severity of prisoners’ punishments.”118 Both officials 
and politicians responded by proposing and designing harsher forms of 
managing the prisoners they perceived to be most dangerous to the prison 
order—the “George Jacksons.”119 As early as 1972, at around the same time 
the Marion Control Unit was established, California Governor Ronald 
Reagan called for the development of new, high-tech maximum-security 
prisons to incarcerate troublemaking convicts.120 
The rise of mass solitary confinement thus springs from the same root 
cause that critical theorists identify as inspiring mass incarceration: the need 
to develop new mechanisms of social control to replace an old order thrown 
into turmoil by mass protests, litigation, and changing societal attitudes.121 In 
 
AMERICA’S PRISONS 30–51 (1998) (describing first what the authors term the “hands-off era” of federal 
court responses to prisoner complaints which accorded prison officials virtually complete discretion over 
running prisons and then recounting the dramatic effect of prison litigation). 
 116 See generally Malcom M. Feeley & Van Swearingen, The Prison Conditions Cases and the 
Bureaucratization of American Corrections: Influences, Impacts and Implications, 24 PACE L. REV. 433 
(2004) (exploring why judicial intervention has been successful in dismantling the “Plantation Model” 
and other forms of maltreatment against prisoners); Whitney Benns, American Slavery, Reinvented, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/prison-labor-in-
america/406177/ [https://perma.cc/2ZGH-RFWZ] (explaining that at Angola, where inmates can be 
forced to work without compensation under threat of punishment as severe as solitary confinement, 
slavery never ended but, in fact, was merely reinvented). 
 117 REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at 84. 
 118 Id. at 78. 
 119 Id. at 84; see also CUMMINS, supra note 103, at 248. 
 120 CUMMINS, supra note 103, at 248 & n.94. 
 121 ALEXANDER, supra note 19, at 13 (arguing that mass incarceration developed as a reaction to the 
demise of Jim Crow as a mechanism of social control and represented a new form of social control); 
Wacquant, supra note 20, at 52 (explaining that mass incarceration represented the backlash against the 
advances won by the social movements and “offered itself as the universal and simplex solution to all 
manners of social problems,” particularly the violent urban upheavals of the mid-’60s; “[a]s the walls of 
the ghetto shook and threatened to crumble, the walls of the prison were correspondingly extended, 
enlarged and fortified.”). 
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both cases of mass isolation and removal from society, the political technique 
involved the imagery of a violent, predatory monster who was no longer 
perceived to be human. 
The supermax and the rise of mass prolonged solitary confinement 
“represent the application of sophisticated, modern technology dedicated 
entirely to the task of social control.”122 Moreover, as with mass 
incarceration, the supermax represents a form of control different from, yet 
connected to, the racist practices used to brutalize, control, and subordinate 
African Americans in the plantation system and convict labor system of 
previous eras. As Professor Angela Davis argues: 
The ultimate manifestation of this phenomenon [of racism in the prison system] 
can be found in the supermax prison, whose main function is to subdue and 
control “problematic” imprisoned populations—again, composed largely of 
black men—who, having been locked away in the most remote and invisible of 
spaces, basically are no longer thought of as human.123 
Mass solitary functions as a form of social control against disobedient, 
disruptive, rebellious, or violent prisoners using three main mechanisms. The 
first, and most obvious, is long-term, total physical isolation. The modern 
supermax uses sophisticated technology to ensure minimal contact between 
staff and prisoners combined with maximum and usually remote surveillance 
of each prisoner.124 This minimizes potential for either individual attacks on 
staff or other prisoners or collective action by prisoners.125 
Second, and equally important, is the element of psychological control, 
effectuated by not only the physical isolation, but the various psychological 
elements used to attempt to break the spirit and resistance of the prisoner. 
Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg described the 
deprivation of reading materials and personal photographs for particularly 
disruptive prisoners at the Pennsylvania supermax, which the majority of the 
 
 122 Craig Haney, “Infamous Punishment”: The Psychological Consequences of Isolation, NAT’L 
PRISON PROJECT J. 3, 3 (1993). 
 123 Angela Y. Davis, Race, Gender, and Prison History: From the Convict Lease System to the 
Supermax Prison, in PRISON MASCULINITIES 35, 44 (Don Sabo, Terry A. Kupers, & Willie London eds., 
2001). 
 124 See Haney, supra note 122, at 3; see generally Charles A. Pettigrew, Technology and the Eighth 
Amendment: The Problem of Supermax Prisons, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 191, 194–98 (2002) (discussing how 
“[a]dvanced technology distinguishes Supermax prisons from their conventional counterparts and allows 
for the isolation of prisoners”). 
 125 Pettigrew, supra note 124, at 195. However, this potential is not entirely eliminated, as the various 
hunger strikes by prisoners at California’s Pelican Bay Security Housing Unit (SHU) illustrate.  
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court upheld as a rational behavioral-management effort, as coming 
“perilously close to a state-sponsored effort at mind control.”126 
California’s policy to break prisoners placed in the SHU for alleged 
gang affiliation was to condition release from isolation on the prisoner 
becoming an informant.127 In California, the attempt to break the prisoner 
through informing (known as “debriefing”) included conditioning virtually 
any human contact on debriefing.128 In one such instance, a prisoner was told 
after his parent died that the only way he could receive any additional phone 
calls to his family was by becoming an informant.129 
Behavioral management control is ubiquitous in supermax prisons and 
control units, another legacy of the Marion experience. An article published 
in Corrections Management Quarterly tellingly concluded that “in control 
units[,] mind control is a primary weapon.”130 As John McCain reflected on 
his experience of solitary confinement as a prisoner of war: “It’s an awful 
thing, solitary. It crushes your spirit and weakens your resistance more 
effectively than any other form of mistreatment.”131 
Finally, the supermax, and officials’ invocation of the need to protect 
inmates and staff from the dangerous, pathological predator, allowed prison 
officials to recover in certain respects the near absolute discretion and 
authority of a bygone era.132 While the first legal challenges of the early 
 
 126 Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 552 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Contra id. at 531 (majority 
opinion). 
 127 REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at 145–46 (revealing through personal narratives of prisoners that 
the only ways to get out of the SHU are “parole, snitch, or die”). 
 128 Griffin v. Gomez, 741 F.3d 10, 13–14 (9th Cir. 2014) (recounting the district court opinion 
holding that keeping Griffin in isolation in Pelican Bay SHU for twenty years with his only way out being 
becoming an informant and thereby risking his and his family’s safety violated the Eighth Amendment);  
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 111, at ⁋ 7 (“Plaintiffs’ and class members’ only way 
out of isolation is to ‘debrief’ to prison administrators (i.e., report on the gang activity of other 
prisoners) . . . . Accordingly, for those many prisoners who refuse or are unable to debrief, defendants’ 
policies result in ‘effectively permanent’ solitary confinement.”); REITER, 23/7, supra note 11, at 145–46 
(particularly for inmates with life sentences, “[s]nitching was the only way [prisoners] could expect to 
leave the SHU alive”). 
 129 See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 111, at ⁋ 52 (recounting that after a 
prisoner’s mother died he was allowed to make a phone call, which was the only call to family or friends 
that he had been allowed in nine years, but was immediately told by prison officials “to think about taking 
advantage of the debriefing program”). 
 130 Rodney J. Henningsen, W. Wesley Johnson & Terry Wells, Supermax Prisons: Panacea or 
Desperation?, 3 CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 53, 58 (1999). 
 131 JOHN MCCAIN & MARK SALTER, FAITH OF MY FATHERS 206 (1999). 
 132 See REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at 5, 7 (“Sociolegal scholars call the resulting pattern of 
compliance ‘legal endogeneity’: courts impose minimum standards of humane treatment, prison officials 
redefine minimum standards as establishing prisoners’ maximum privileges, and the courts defer.  . . . 
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1970s imposed some significant restraints on official discretion,133 by the 
mid- to late 1990s, the courts had developed a largely hands-off policy on 
administrative segregation and supermax confinement.134 Even the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Wilkinson v. Austin in 2005 recognized that prisoners had 
a liberty interest in avoiding prolonged solitary confinement in the Ohio 
supermax, although the Court only required prison officials to follow 
minimal due process procedures.135 The upshot of the judiciary’s legitimation 
of supermax confinement was that for decades officials had almost absolute 
control over who could be placed in the supermax and for how long and, 
short of physical brutality, the treatment they received once so placed. As 
Professor Davis has argued, this absolute authority is reminiscent of the 
impunity with which the convict lease system operated in total disregard of 
the humanity of the mostly Black prisoners.136 
In a sense, the supermax perfected the disciplinary, social control 
functions of the modern prison first articulated by the brilliant French 
philosopher Michel Foucault.137 Foucault explains the modern prison as a 
panoptic method of control, in which the architecture of the prison is adopted 
for constant surveillance, which along with branding the individual as 
“dangerous/harmless” or “normal/abnormal,” permits the state to engage in 
“coercive assignment” and control and regulate behavior.138 Interestingly, 
 
[W]hen officials said the prisoners in Pelican Bay were uniformly dangerous and that the [supermax] was 
absolutely necessary, judges took them at their word.”). 
 133 See supra notes 115–116 and the prison litigation described in REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at 
68–70. 
 134 See In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F.3d 464 
(4th Cir. 1999), abrogation recognized by Latson v. Clarke, 794 F. App’x. 266, 270 (4th Cir. 2019); 
Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 168 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484–
86 (1995) (explaining that thirty days in solitary confinement did not constitute an “atypical and 
significant hardship” giving rise to a liberty interest requiring prison officials to accord prisoners any due 
process prior to placement). 
 135 545 U.S. 209, 229–30 (2005). 
 136 Davis, supra note 123, at 44; see also Convict Leasing, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Nov. 1, 2013), 
https://eji.org/news/history-racial-injustice-convict-leasing/ [https://perma.cc/L5YV-TGHT] (“After the 
Civil War, slavery persisted in the form of convict leasing, a system in which Southern states leased 
prisoners to private railways, mines, and large plantations. While states profited, prisoners earned no pay 
and faced inhumane, dangerous, and often deadly work conditions. Thousands of black people were 
forced into what authors have termed ‘slavery by another name’ until the 1930s.”). Convict leasing was 
thus clearly related to the plantation model of prisons. Benns, supra note 116. 
 137 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 201–02 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., 1977). 
 138 Id. at 199–210; see also Sandra McGunigall-Smith & Robert Johnson, Escape from Death Row: 
A Study of “Tripping” as an Individual Adjustment Strategy Among Death Row Prisoners , 6 PIERCE L. 
REV. 533, 543 (2008) (“SHUs are the epitome of the panoptic gaze that lay at the heart of the disciplinary 
society envisioned by Foucault.”). 
115:159 (2020) Mass Solitary and Mass Incarceration 
185 
given today’s coronavirus context, Foucault traces the origins of the modern 
prison system to towns consumed by medieval plague, where the people 
were isolated from each other and subjected to constant surveillance.139 He 
also notes the turn to solitary confinement in French history, following a 
period of political agitation and revolt: “The wave of revolt . . . and perhaps 
the general agitation in the country in the years 1842–3 resulted in the 
adoption in 1844 of the Pennsylvanian régime of absolute isolation . . . .”140 
In the United States, the rise of mass solitary, as with the growth of 
mass incarceration, was racially discriminatory. Various studies indicate that 
the racial disparities that characterize the prison population generally, as 
compared to the United States population as a whole, are replicated amongst 
those placed in solitary confinement, although not in as extreme a form. A 
1980 statistical analysis of a single medium-security prison in the South 
demonstrated, albeit on a small scale, “that the race of an inmate was 
correlated with the disciplinary decisions of correctional officers.”141 The 
study found that “black and white inmates were equally likely to engage in 
rule-breaking activity,” yet “they were not equally likely to be reported for 
rule infractions.”142 Similarly, when Wisconsin opened its supermax prison, 
of its first 215 inmates, approximately 60% were African-American, with 
Hispanics constituting almost all of the rest.143 These statistics are startling 
in a state where 46% of the prison inmates were African-American and 17% 
were Hispanic, and yet only 5% of the state’s population was African-
American and less than 2% was Hispanic.144 
More recently, the 2014 ASCA-Liman Report found that in the twenty-
two reporting jurisdictions, African-American males constituted 48% of the 
 
 139 Foucault writes that in a medieval town consumed by the plague: 
Each individual is fixed in his place. And, if he moves, he does so at the risk of his life, contagion 
or punishment. Inspection functions ceaselessly. The gaze is alert everywhere: ‘A considerable 
body of militia, commanded by good officers and men of substance’, guards at the gates, at the 
town hall and in every quarter to ensure the prompt obedience of the people and the most absolute 
authority of the magistrates, ‘as also to observe all disorder, theft and extortion’. At each of the 
town gates there will be an observation post; at the end of each street sentinels. 
FOUCAULT, supra note 137, at 195–96. 
 140 Id. at 318 n.6. That adoption was short-lived and repealed in 1847. Id. 
 141 Andrea C. Armstrong, Race, Prison Discipline, and the Law, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 759, 761 
(2015). 
 142 Id. at 765 (quoting Eric D. Poole & Robert M. Regoli, Race, Institutional Rule Breaking, and 
Disciplinary Response: A Study of Discretionary Decision Making in Prison, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 931, 
944 (1980)). 
 143 Jerry R. DeMaio, Comment, If You Build It, They Will Come: The Threat of Overclassification in 
Wisconsin’s Supermax Prison, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 207, 229. 
 144 Id. at 229 n.129. 
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male population in administrative segregation, as compared to 39% of the 
general prison population.145 The reported demographics for female prisoners 
demonstrated an even more significant racial disparity, with Black female 
prisoners constituting only 23% of the total female custodial population but 
35% of the female restricted housing population across the jurisdictions 
reporting.146 Those statistics do not include California, which did not 
participate in the ASCA-Liman study,147 and has an extremely 
disproportionate racial/ethnic balance in its usage of solitary. In California, 
“Latinos made up 42 percent of the general prison population, but 86 percent 
of those in solitary confinement. Whites, by contrast, were 22 percent of the 
general population, but only nine percent of those in solitary.”148 
In 2016, the New York Times published a comprehensive report finding 
that “racial disparities were embedded in the [state] prison experience in 
New York.”149 According to the report, Black and Latino prisoners were 
disciplined at higher rates than white prisoners—in some cases twice as 
often—and were sent to solitary confinement more frequently and for longer 
durations than their white counterparts.150 “At Clinton, a prison near the 
Canadian border where only one of the 998 guards is African-American, 
black inmates were nearly four times as likely to be sent to isolation as 
whites, and they were held there for an average of 125 days, compared to 90 
days for whites.”151 The disparities in disciplinary sanctions were often 
greatest for “vaguely defined” infractions that gave discretion to officers and 
did not require production of physical evidence, like disobeying a direct 
order.152 Indeed, vaguely defined infractions have been a powerful tool in 
perpetuating supermax facilities and prolonged solitary confinement. In a 
state where Blacks make up only 14% of the general population but nearly 
half of the prison population,153 these reports indicate that the racial character 
of mass incarceration is repeated in the use of mass solitary confinement. As 
 
 145 TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 13, at 31. 
 146 Id. at 36. 
 147 Id. at 76 n.101. 
 148 Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, The Link Between Race and Solitary Confinement, ATLANTIC (Dec. 
5, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/race-solitary-confinement/509456/ 
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State’s Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/nyregion/new-york-
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with mass incarceration, mass solitary constitutes a racialized system of 
control.154 
The problem of how to reassert social and political control in the wake 
of civil rights protests, urban rebellions and prison work stoppages, protests, 
and riots of the ’60s and ’70s drove both political leaders and prison officials 
to develop new mechanisms of control. By utilizing the narrative of the 
increasing violence and disruption in American society and prisons, officials 
were able to institute both the massive increase of incarceration and the rise 
of the supermax within prisons to isolate people from society and humanity 
in an attempt to end racial and political protest and change. 
III. THE PREVENTIVE MODEL 
The Marion experience also illustrates the shift from the disciplinary 
model of placing people in solitary for determinate periods of time as 
punishment for specific misconduct, utilized generally throughout the 
twentieth century, to the preventive model of the modern supermax, where 
prisoners are held in solitary indefinitely as a measure to prevent future 
violence or disturbances. The preventive paradigm utilizes exceedingly 
vague criteria containing no clear indication to prisoners as to what conduct 
will result in their placement in solitary and how they can eventually earn 
their release.155 Prison officials argue that because solitary confinement is not 
“punitive” but instead “preventive,” prisoners are afforded less rights and the 
actions of officials are to be accorded less scrutiny by the courts.156 This 
 
 154 Professor Andrea Armstrong writes, “[M]inority offenders may be more likely to be perceived as 
a disciplinary threat by correctional officers, regardless of an offender’s actual behavior.” Armstrong, 
supra note 141, at 770 (emphasis omitted). Moreover, the implicit biases of prison guards is particularly 
relevant in cases of “minor or ambiguous conduct charges” where “‘vaguely worded “catchall” rules’ . . . 
almost always pertain to an inmate’s attitude rather than conduct” because these rules are “especially 
susceptible to . . . influence by an individual prison guard’s implicit racial preferences.” Id. at 770–72 
(emphases omitted).  
 155 See Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 731 n.14 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (“The memorandum 
lists the following behavior as criteria for classification to high maximum security status: The inmate’s 
conduct or continued presence at the sending institution poses a serious threat to . . . the security of the 
prison; The nature of the inmate’s criminal offense indicates that the inmate poses a serious threat to the 
physical safety of any person, or to the security of the prison . . . .”); Johnson v. Wetzel, 209 F. Supp. 3d 
766, 771–72 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (stating that a prisoner was retained in indefinite solitary confinement for a 
period of thirty-six years despite having committed no serious misconduct for the last twenty-eight years, 
on the basis of his escape history and undefined “threats to harm others”). 
 156 Ohio argued in the Supreme Court case of Wilkinson v. Austin that because their decisions in 
placing prisoners in the supermax were predictive of dangerousness, namely preventive, they did not have 
to accord the prisoners the full due process protections provided for disciplinary proceedings. Brief for 
Petitioners at 19–20, Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–29 (2005) (No. 04-495) (“[W]here the 
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paradigm allows prison officials wide discretion to assert control over certain 
allegedly disruptive prisoners and the ability to threaten the rest of the prison 
population with similar consequences if they misbehave or associate with the 
wrong people. The ascent of the preventive paradigm for prolonged solitary 
confinement is thus tied to the rise of the “violent prisoner” narrative and the 
use of the supermax to reassert officials’ control.157 
Judicial decisions affirm the dichotomy between disciplinary and 
preventive detention, as the Supreme Court’s opinion in Wilkinson v. Austin 
demonstrates. In Wilkinson, the Court upheld a lower court’s finding that 
prisoners had a liberty interest in avoiding placement in Ohio State 
Penitentiary (OSP), the Ohio supermax. However, the Court determined that 
the due process requirements for prisoners facing indeterminate solitary 
confinement for preventive reasons are minimal.158 The upshot of that 
decision was that a prisoner in Ohio accused of murdering another prisoner, 
for example, could be disciplined and sent to segregation for a determinate 
term, after a due process hearing which comported with the protections set 
forth by the Court in Wolff v. McDonnell.159 Yet, officials could also send a 
prisoner to supermax for years for relatively minor offenses while affording 
them less and weaker due process protections. For instance, one of the named 
plaintiffs in Wilkinson, Daryl Heard, was charged with conspiring to bring 
marijuana into the prison and “punished” by receiving fifteen days in 
disciplinary segregation. He then was transferred from a medium-security 
prison to the supermax as a “preventive” administrative measure for drug 
distribution, with only minimal due process, and kept in the supermax for 
years.160 Indeed the district court in Wilkinson found that more than fifty 
people in Ohio were transferred to the supermax even though they had 
committed no violence in prison and their only rules violation was drug 
involvement while in prison.161 Like mass incarceration, the use of solitary 
confinement as a preventive measure is often justified by the desire to limit 
gang violence. While gangs undoubtedly present serious problems in 
prisons, the preventive paradigm is problematic because it allows prison 
 
decision is predictive, the other Mathews factors, especially the private interest affected [namely, the 
prisoner’s interest], carry very little weight, if any.”). 
 157 See supra Part I (discussing violent prisoner narrative) and Part II (discussing supermaxes and 
prison officials reasserting their control). 
 158 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–29 (2005). 
 159 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
 160 Austin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 730, 731 n.14. 
 161 Id. at 736. 
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administrators broad discretion to send and confine prisoners to supermax 
facilities.162 
The preventive paradigm for supermax confinement reached its apex in 
California’s Security Housing Unit (SHU) at Pelican Bay State Prison. 
There, any California prisoner allegedly affiliated with a prison gang could 
be sent to solitary confinement based simply on their association, without 
any evidence or act of prison misconduct.163 In 2011, more than 1,000 
prisoners were assigned to preventive, so-called “administrative” detention, 
and held in very isolating conditions. Prisoners were confined to small, 
eighty-square-foot windowless cells for 22.5 to 24 hours per day.164 Phone 
calls with family or friends were prohibited, as were contact visits with any 
visitors. Prisoners left their cells only for approximately ninety minutes per 
day to recreate alone in a facility with high walls and a partial grate covering 
the top so that they received virtually no direct sunlight. The recreation area, 
only several times larger than their cells, was devoid of anything but one 
handball. While prisoners were able to communicate with each other by 
shouting through the walls, social contact was limited, disembodied, and 
sometimes punished. The prisoners had virtually no educational or other 
programming, and no work or vocational programs. These prisoners had not 
seen trees, birds, or grass for years, had not touched another human being 
 
 162 Id. at 748–49, 751 (“The Department chose to move Roe to a more secure and more expensive 
facility without articulating a single affirmative action he had undertaken. Instead, he was allegedly 
moved because of longtime gang membership and his involvement in a racial incident more than five 
years ago. These justifications ring hollow . . . . [Similarly,] Thompson had a classification review. The 
hearing committee’s worksheet indicated that Thompson had no rules violation findings, no 
administrative control placement, and no violence in the last five years . . . . Nonetheless, without any 
notice of the evidence claimed against him, the Department sent Thompson to the OSP” and the 
reclassification committee’s recommendations to reduce Thompson’s security classification “were denied 
because of Thompson’s alleged gang membership”). Under Ohio’s New Policy, which was a reform 
measure, a prisoner could be sent to the supermax if he was “identified by the institution Security Threat 
Group Coordinator as a leader, enforcer, or recruiter of a security threat group, which is actively involved 
in violent or disruptive behavior.” Id. at 751. As the district court pointed out, this provision did not cabin 
the Coordinator’s discretion—so long as he or she determined that the inmate was a gang leader, the 
prisoner could be sent to the supermax. Id. 
 163 CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 15, § 3378(c)(4) (2013) (“An associate is an inmate/parolee or any person 
who is involved periodically or regularly with members or associates of a gang. This identification 
requires at least three (3) independent source items of documentation indicative of association with 
validated gang members or associates. Validation of an inmate/parolee or any person as an associate of a 
prison gang shall require at least one (1) source item be a direct link to a current or former validated 
member or associate of the gang, or to an inmate/parolee or any person who is validated by the department 
within six (6) months of the established or estimated date of activity identified in the evidence 
considered.”) (repealed 2014). 
 164 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 111. Prisoners were only entitled to a fifteen-
minute family call in event of an emergency, such as if a close family member died. The amended 
complaint contains the facts asserted in the rest of this paragraph. See also REITER, 23/7, supra note 14. 
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during their time in the SHU, and many had no visitors due to the isolated 
location of the prison. 
By 2011, approximately five hundred prisoners at Pelican Bay SHU had 
been in solitary confinement for over ten years, seventy-eight of them for 
more than two decades.165 For most, there was no way out. They had not been 
placed in solitary confinement because of some serious misconduct that they 
had committed in prison, nor because of the heinousness of their criminal 
offense. Rather, they had been placed in solitary because of an alleged 
affiliation or association with a prison gang. They need not be an actual or 
alleged gang member; the alleged affiliation need not even rise to the level 
of a gang member, and many of the prisoners confined in the Pelican Bay 
SHU were classified as associates.166 A prisoner could be labeled a so-called 
“associate”—defined as someone who is not necessarily a member of the 
gang but who periodically associates with gang members—and placed in the 
SHU.167 Tattoos, artwork, political writings, and greeting cards which 
allegedly had some indicia of gang involvement all sufficed for SHU 
placement.168 Moreover, prisoners were not put in solitary for a determinate 
term, but rather were housed there indefinitely. Only once every six years 
was their placement reviewed, and virtually all were perfunctorily retained 
 
 165 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 33. 
 166 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3378 (c)(4) (defining an associate of a gang eligible to be sent to the 
Security Housing Unit (SHU) for an indefinite term as “an inmate/parolee or any person who is involved 
periodically or regularly with members or associates of a gang”). Under this vague definition almost any 
prisoner who had some vague and periodic association with a gang could and often would be sent to the 
SHU. See infra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 167 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3378 (c)(4). 
 168 Prisoners were both placed in SHU initially and then retained there as “active” gang affiliates 
based on indicia of so-called gang association such as tattoos, political writings, and artwork. See 
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 111, ¶¶ 93, 104, 105. George Ruiz, a sixty-nine-year-
old prisoner, spent twenty-eight years in solitary confinement—twenty-two at the Pelican Bay SHU—
and was denied inactive gang status for his possession of photocopied drawings alleged to contain 
symbols associated with a gang. See id. ¶¶ 14, 104. Gabriel Reyes, forty-six, spent fourteen years in 
isolation at the Pelican Bay SHU and was also denied inactive status on the basis of a tattoo drawing 
found in his cell which included a geometric pattern (known as the G-Shield) that had been “rejected as 
a gang-related source item in 1996, 2003, and 2005.” See id. ¶¶ 18, 105. Jeffrey Franklin, fifty-two, spent 
twenty-two years in Pelican Bay’s SHU and was denied inactive status after his name appeared on another 
prisoner’s gang roster. He was said to be “communicat[ing] by talking” with a validated member of a 
different gang thereafter, which was instructed to be considered at his next review. See id. at 15, 106. 
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in solitary.169 The only practical ways out were to be released from prison, to 
become an informant, or to die.170 
Placement and retention at Pelican Bay built on the paradigm 
established at Marion in the 1970s, where vague standards for who could be 
placed in the prison’s control unit—coupled with new guidelines as to who 
could be transferred to Marion’s high security General Population—allowed 
for a proliferation of arbitrariness in assignment to solitary confinement.171 
Notably, a report investigating the Marion Lockdown concluded that 80% of 
inmates at Marion in the fall of 1984 had security ratings that would have 
normally required placement at a lower-security institution, not a Level 6 
prison, such as Marion.172 Nonetheless, many of these prisoners were housed 
at Marion based on discretionary determinations from administrative 
committees, which might have been arbitrary, improper, or dependent on 
confidential information which was never disclosed to the prisoner.173 
The 1977 Supreme Court decision in Jones v. North Carolina 
Prisoners’ Labor Union, which equated any collective organizing, whether 
violent or not, with the potential for disruption, is illustrative of the Court’s 
use of the preventive rationale in the prison context.174 In Jones, the Court 
upheld officials’ prohibition of prisoners from soliciting other prisoners to 
join the union and of all union meetings. While the Secretary of the 
Department of Corrections stated that “[t]he purpose of the union may well 
be worthwhile projects,” and the district court held that there was “not one 
scintilla of evidence to suggest that the Union has been utilized to disrupt the 
operation of the penal institutions,” the Supreme Court nonetheless upheld 
the ban because this “historical finding . . . does not state that appellants’ 
fears as to future disruptions are groundless.”175 Defendants claimed that 
once a union was established, even if it had salutary purposes, “[w]ork 
stoppages and mutinies are easily foreseeable. Riots and chaos would almost 
 
 169 See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Extension of Settlement Agreement Based on Systemic Due Process 
Violations at 56–57, Ashker v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017), available at 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2017/11/Mot%20to%20Extend%20Settlement%20REDA
CTED.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XP5-XFNN]. 
 170 Or, in the vernacular, to “parole, snitch, or die.” See Keramet A. Reiter, Parole, Snitch, or Die: 
California’s Supermax Prisons and Prisoners, 1997–2007, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 530, 536 (2012). 
 171 New assignment guidelines were instituted when the BOP designated Marion as a Level 6, super -
security prison in 1979. See supra note 93 and accompanying discussion. 
 172 WARD & BREED, supra note 74, at 35. 
 173 Id. 
 174 433 U.S. 119 (1977). 
 175 Id. at 127 & n.5. 
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inevitably result.”176 The Supreme Court found those fears rational and 
deferred to the expertise of the correctional officials.177 This same rationale 
permitted preventive administrative segregation for individuals who had 
committed no violent misconduct, but had the potential to do so in the future. 
Both banning unions and creating supermaxes were preventive measures 
designed to augment official control over prisoners. 
The replacement of typical punishment rationales with preventive and 
incapacitation strategies both drove the growth of supermax confinement and 
played a significant role in the rise of mass incarceration. As various scholars 
have noted, the rise of mass incarceration is associated with an increased 
reliance on penal incapacitation as a preventive measure.178 Starting in the 
1970s, the criminal justice system’s focus shifted from punishing past crimes 
to the prevention of future misconduct by means of incarceration and the 
ongoing control exercised over supposedly dangerous offenders.179 The 
enactment of statutes such as “three strikes” laws, which authorize life 
sentences for repeat offenders; the criminalization of gang membership and 
recruitment; the continuation of detention for “sexual predators” beyond the 
service of the criminal sentences; and new sentencing guidelines which 
increased the sentence of offenders whose past histories allegedly make them 
most likely to commit future crimes, all reflect the shift from a focus on 
 
 176 Id. at 127. 
 177 Id. at 128–29. 
 178 Jonathon Simon, The Return of the Medical Model: Disease and the Meaning of Imprisonment 
from John Howard to Brown v. Plata, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 217, 239 (2013); see also BRUCE 
WESTERN, THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF THE PRISON BOOM 37–38 (2005) (the prison boom was 
fueled by turning the penal system “to the twin tasks of incapacitation and deterrence”); FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 
8–12 (1995) (tracing shift from rehabilitation to incapacitation and its contribution to mass incarceration); 
Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of 
Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452 (1992) (“[T]he new penology is markedly 
less concerned with responsibility, fault, moral sensibility, diagnosis, or intervention and treatment of the 
individual offender. Rather, it is concerned with techniques to identify, classify, and manage groupings 
sorted by dangerousness.”); Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Throw Away the Key or Throw Away the Jail? 
The Effect of Punishment on Recidivism and Social Cost, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017, 1027 (2015) (“In the 
United States, incapacitation became the predominant logic for the prison boom . . . .”); Jonathan Simon, 
Mass Incarceration: From Social Policy to Social Problem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING 
AND CORRECTIONS 23, 28 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012) (describing the abandonment of 
control in California in the 1970s and the increase in incarceration that followed, stating the change 
“abandoned the focus on rehabilitation in favor of punitive segregation intended to achieve deterrence 
and, more reliably, incapacitative effects”). 
 179 Robinson, supra note 25; Carol S. Steiker, The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 771 (1998); Lucia Zedner, Seeking Security by Eroding Rights: The Side-Stepping of Due 
Process, in SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 257, 259–61 (Benjamin J. Goold & Liora Lazarus eds., 2007). 
115:159 (2020) Mass Solitary and Mass Incarceration 
193 
punishing criminal behavior to incapacitating dangerous individuals.180 
Another manifestation of the preventive rationale is the continuation of the 
criminal justice system’s control over former prisoners and the debilitating 
consequences of conviction—ex-felons may be denied the right to vote, 
excluded from juries, and relegated to an often “racially segregated and 
subordinated existence.”181 
Because the preventive paradigm often treats entire groups of people as 
dangerous based on their alleged characteristics, its prevalence has produced 
significant racial implications. For example, the dramatic rise in the use of 
the bail system, which jails mostly poor and African-American people 
accused of crime prior to their conviction primarily because of their 
presumed dangerousness, reflects the preventive model.182 Similarly, new 
policing tactics that fall heavily on Black and Latino communities, such as 
“stop and frisk” and “broken windows,” have as their main ideological 
underpinnings the targeting of so-called attributes of dangerousness as a 
preventive measure against crime.183 Inside prisons, states such as California 
and Texas have placed thousands of Hispanics into solitary confinement 
because of alleged association with gangs. The vagueness of the 
dangerousness criteria allowed ethnic identity to often become a proxy for 
gang association, which itself was a proxy for dangerousness.184 
 
 180 See DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE FUTURE 9–11 (2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/189106-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GF7V-6F3M]; Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, How Much Punishment is Enough?: 
Embracing Uncertainty in Modern Sentencing Reform, 24 J.L. & POL’Y 345 (2016); Robinson, supra 
note 25, at 1429–31. 
 181 ALEXANDER, supra note 19, at 4; Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive 
State, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301 (2015). As Michelle Alexander has argued, these consequences are 
an important element of the New Jim Crow, which also has a preventive rationale. ALEXANDER, supra 
note 19, at 4. 
 182 Of the 2.3 million people incarcerated in 2019, more than 20% of them had not been convicted 
of a crime but were in preventive pretrial detention. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration, 
The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/3TYR-UGZR]. Over 555,000 
people are locked up, mainly in local jails, who have not been convicted of a crime. Due to the high price 
of money bail, “people with low incomes are more likely to face the harms of pretrial detention.” Id.; see 
also Wendy Sawyer, How Race Impacts Who Is Detained Pretrial, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 9, 
2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/10/09/pretrial_race/ [https://perma.cc/AWA8-JPUN]. 
 183 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y 2013) (noting the 
disproportionate stops of Blacks and Hispanics in holding that the use of stop and frisk without reasonable 
suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 184 See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 
27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237 (2015) (arguing that risk assessment is an unacceptable tool that will exacerbate 
racial disparities in the criminal justice system as it has collapsed risk into prior criminal history, which 
has become a proxy for race). 
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The preventive rationale underlying both mass solitary and mass 
incarceration was also fueled by a sense of crisis and permanent emergency, 
which has been a prominent feature of post-World War II American 
society.185 As noted earlier, riots, disturbances, and other crises in prisons 
were traditionally met with temporary lockdowns or discrete periods of 
solitary confinement for prisoners who were disruptive. The marked change 
that began at Marion was to make the lockdown permanent, borne out of a 
sense that the crisis was not temporary. The supermax institutionalized the 
concept of permanent lockdown so that the struggle against gangs in prison 
required the indefinite, often permanent isolation of any prisoner deemed to 
be associated or affiliated with a gang. In that respect, the fight against gangs 
in prison can be analogized to the “war on terror” that the Bush 
Administration initiated. In response to a perceived existential crisis and a 
state of permanent emergency, the preventive paradigm played an important 
role in both mass efforts to detain and isolate individuals, with little due 
process, for their alleged (and often erroneous) association with dangerous 
groups.186 
Courts have affirmed the constitutionality of permanent lockdowns in 
response to a perceived emergency.187 For example, in response to a threat 
from a designated group, the Fourth Circuit approved isolation for any 
alleged gang member, noting that in order to forestall a riot or other 
disturbance, prison officials may act without any showing that a particular 
individual is dangerous.188 According to the court, allowing prison officials 
to act only after a demonstration of individual dangerousness would deprive 
them of the “all-important option of prevention.”189 By the time of the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision, the prisoners had already been isolated for more than three 
years, simply due to their alleged affiliation, without any showing of 
individual dangerousness or of immediate threat of disorder.190 The 
perception of danger and threat had become permanent. Similarly, in Hewitt 
v. Helms, the Supreme Court allowed administrative segregation with only 
 
 185 See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1400–04 
(1989) (describing the development of permanent emergency mentality, where conceptual crisis is 
permanent, and emergency authority, which was once seen as temporary, thereby becomes permanent).  
 186 See DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR 
ON TERROR 18–19 (2007). 
 187 See, e.g., Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988). For a discussion on Bruscino, see 
supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
 188 In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F.3d 464, 
470 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 370–72. 
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minimal due process in response to a threat of riot,191 although, as Justice 
Stevens wrote in dissent, the emergency justification for such segregation 
only lasted a few days.192 Nonetheless, the inmate’s segregation continued 
even after the temporary emergency had ended.193 The distinction between 
emergency and normalcy had broken down; the supermax thus represented 
emergency normalized. 
Similarly, the rise of mass incarceration has been accompanied by a 
crisis mentality—illustrated by the terminology “war on drugs” or “war on 
crime”—initiated by President Lyndon Johnson over fifty years ago.194 A 
carceral instinct became a permanent feature of the crisis mentality 
characterized by these never-ending “wars.” As Professor David Garland 
notes, the criminal justice system has been in a “perpetual sense of crisis,” 
adding, however, that the term “crisis” seems “inappropriate for a situation 
that has now endured for several decades.”195 Moreover, that the high rates 
of incarceration, particularly of African Americans and Hispanics, have 
continued irrespective of actual crime rates suggests a mentality of perpetual 
crisis and emergency regardless of the existence of an imminent threat to 
society.196 Thus, the preventive model, premised on an ongoing sense of 
permanent emergency requiring the incapacitation of dangerous people who 
were usually nonwhites, underlay both the rise of mass incarceration and 
prolonged, mass solitary confinement. 
IV. ENDING PROLONGED SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
By the 1980s, courts had affirmed and legitimated prolonged solitary 
confinement under the theory that prison officials, charged with preventing 
violence and preserving order in prisons, had no alternative to the permanent 
or very extended mass lock-up of dangerous and violent prisoners.197 That 
rationale has three fundamental flaws, and understanding those flaws is 
essential to today’s movement for the reform and elimination of prolonged 
 
 191 459 U.S. 460, 472–76 (1983). 
 192 Id. at 489 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 193 Id. 
 194 Elizabeth Hinton, Why We Should Reconsider the War on Crime, TIME (Mar. 20, 2015), 
https://time.com/3746059/war-on-crime-history/ [https://perma.cc/FY7Y-XPJN] (noting that fifty years 
ago, President Johnson called for a “War on Crime”). 
 195 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY 
SOCIETY 19 (2001). 
 196 Andrew D. Leipold, Is Mass Incarceration Inevitable?, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1579, 1592–93 
(2019) (“[T]here was a sustained drop in crime during the same period where there was a massive increase 
in the number of inmates—most of the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s . . . .”). 
 197 See supra notes 47–55 (discussing the high-profile judicial decisions of Bruscino and Wilkinson). 
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solitary confinement. First, while judges such as Richard Posner understood 
that solitary confinement causes mental harm, later developments in the 
fields of psychology, neuroscience, and social science deepened the 
scientific consensus that prolonged solitary presents a profound risk of 
devastating mental and physical harm.198 Second, the widely held view in the 
1980s and ’90s that supermax prisons were locking up the worst of the 
worst199 turns out to be false. Major prison systems such as California, Ohio, 
and New York have recognized that most of the prisoners preventively 
incarcerated in supermax or other prolonged solitary units did not require 
such draconian isolation and instead could have been managed in general 
population units.200 Finally, even for the relatively small number of truly 
dangerous, violent prisoners, who require separation from the general prison 
population, alternatives to the modern supermax have been proposed since 
the 1980s and continue to be developed today.201 Although viable alternatives 
have been proposed at critical junctures in the process of the “super-
maximumization” of American prisons, these have largely been ignored by 
prison officials and legislatures. 
A. Rejecting the Preventive Paradigm 
The preventive paradigm—whether used in the context of the “war on 
terror,” the “war on crime or drugs,” or the confinement of violent 
prisoners—generally leads to overclassification of so-called dangerousness 
 
 198 See generally SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, supra note 11 (containing chapters by social scientists, 
psychologists, and neuroscientists demonstrating harm to physical health caused by loneliness or lack of 
social interaction, mental harm and risk of social death, and potential harm to the brain caused by 
prolonged solitary confinement). 
 199 See DeMaio, supra note 143, at 210 (explaining that the benefit of removing the “most dangerous 
inmates” from the general prison population is the “general premise upon which supermax prisons are 
based”); Kurki & Morris, supra note 29, at 391 (“The new ‘dangerous’ prisoner is described as more 
violent, more disturbed, more disruptive, and, therefore, less likely to adjust to ordinary prison 
conditions . . . . Prison administrators often describe supermax inmates as ‘the worst of the worst[,]’ 
people who have nothing to lose and therefore do not hesitate from ‘taking a swing at a corrections officer 
or preying on another inmate.’” (citations omitted)); Maximilienne Bishop, Note, Supermax Prisons: 
Increasing Security or Permitting Persecution?, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 461 (2005) (“Super-maximum 
security (‘Supermax’) facilities are purported to house the most invidious and dangerous criminals in the 
nation’s prisons who pose such a threat to prison security that they can only be controlled by isolation.”). 
 200 Settlement Agreement at 4, Peoples v. Fischer, No. 1:11-cv-02694-SAS (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 
2015), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-NY-0062-0011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9KPZ-BCF8]; Settlement Agreement at 10, Ashker v. Brown, No. C 09-05796 CW 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015), available at https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/09/2015-09-
01-ashker-Settlement_Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6SS-DA44]. See infra note 217 and 
accompanying text on Ohio’s conversion of most of its supermax prison to a maximum-security prison 
after the district court decision in Austin v. Wilkinson. 
 201 See infra Section I.B. 
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without clear standards or due process to restrict the state in whom it 
detains.202 That is exactly what happened in the prolonged solitary 
confinement context. An alternative urged at the time of the Marion 
lockdown was to discard the preventive model and return to a system that 
addresses crisis and misconduct through temporary lockdowns. This system 
would discipline, for a determinate period, only those prisoners who had 
engaged in serious misconduct, as opposed to preventively locking down the 
entire prison permanently.203 
California and Ohio are examples of the enormous overclassification of 
supposedly dangerous prisoners. California, as already mentioned, placed 
thousands of alleged gang members or associates in supermax SHU prisons 
with no way out. In the context of a lawsuit brought by a class of prisoners 
held in Pelican Bay SHU, James Austin, a corrections classification expert, 
submitted a report finding that California’s use of a status-based system 
relying on gang affiliation for placement and retention in the SHU results in 
a system whereby individuals who actually present no major management 
problem are retained in SHU for “excessive periods of time.”204 Austin’s 
conclusions were shared by Emmitt Sparkman, a longtime correctional 
official who had overseen the reforms of Mississippi’s solitary confinement 
unit.205 Austin also discovered that the California Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation (CDCR) never examined whether or not SHU placement 
of gang-affiliated inmates reduces violence throughout its prison system.206 
 
 202 See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 186, for the general problems attendant to the preventive 
paradigm. 
 203 See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 107 (congressional testimony of Jan Susler) (citing 
cases and wardens challenging long-term lockdowns); WARD & BREED, supra note 74, at 47 (testimony 
of David Ward) (arguing that lockdown should not be permanent). 
 204 Expert Report of Dr. James Austin at 2, 7–8, Ashker v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 13, 2015), available at https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/Redacted_ 
Austin%20Expert%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSW9-QSBH]. Austin studied the records of the 
named plaintiffs and found that they had “an exceptionally low rate of disciplinary infractions for a ten-
year period for a high security population.” Id. at 15. The vast majority of those violations were minor, 
such as unauthorized talking. For Austin, “[a] system that places such inmates in SHU for over a decade 
defies all logic.” Id. He concluded that “[t]he inmate classification and disciplinary conduct data all 
suggest that these inmates, in general, do not require SHU placement.” Id. at 19. Indeed, Austin’s review 
of forty-one plaintiff class members found that over 70% were assessed by the CDCR as “low risk,” a 
designation seemingly in contradiction to their continued placement in the SHU. Id. at 20. 
 205 Expert Report of Emmit L. Sparkman at 3, 17–19, Ashker v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2015), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0054-
0023.pdf [https://perma.cc/S72L-V5LP] (“There is no penological justification for long term special 
housing of offenders for investigation, protective custody, non-violent rule violations, length and/or type 
of prison sentence. . . . [T]he CDCR places and retains more offenders [than other prison systems] without 
safety and security justification for longer periods of time with harsher conditions.”). 
 206 See Expert Report of Dr. James Austin, supra note 204, at 11. 
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When Austin conducted that review himself, he found that the increased use 
of SHU had not produced lower assault rates in CDCR prisons, but rather, 
the rate of assault increased.207 
After more than twenty-five years, CDCR finally admitted that its SHU 
policy of preventively keeping prisoners associated with gangs in prolonged 
solitary confinement “was a mistake”208 and settled the Ashker v. Brown 
lawsuit, agreeing to no longer place prisoners in indeterminate solitary 
confinement based on gang status but only for proven serious misconduct 
after a due process hearing resulting in a determinate SHU sentence.209 While 
the determinate SHU sentences prisoners can receive are still extensive, 210 
and CDCR continues to send many individuals to the SHU based on 
unreliable or fabricated confidential information,211 California is placing far 
fewer prisoners in solitary confinement and has converted a wing of the 
infamous Pelican Bay SHU into a minimum security general population 
unit.212 
Similarly, Ohio’s practices illustrate the use of the supermax to house 
hundreds of prisoners who do not require such high security. Ohio built its 
supermax in Youngstown in response to the 1993 Lucasville Prison Riot and 
started placing prisoners there in 1998.213 The Lucasville riot was 
undoubtedly brought on by overcrowding, faulty prison management, and a 
failure to respond to legitimate prisoner grievances and peaceful protests, 
 
 207 Id. at 20. 
 208 Oprah Winfrey, Reforming Solitary Confinement at an Infamous California Prison, 60 MINUTES 
(July 22, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-reforming-solitary-confinement-at-an-
infamous-california-prison/ [https://perma.cc/VA36-5UT2] [hereinafter 60 MINUTES] (Scott Kernan, 
Secretary of CDCR, states that the policy of sending gang members to SHU indefinitely “was a 
mistake . . . . It didn’t work because of the impact on the offenders.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Expert 
Report of Dr. James Austin, supra note 204, at 13 & n.18 (noting that the CDCR has explicitly 
acknowledged that its policy “overclassified” prisoners for SHU placement). 
 209 Settlement Agreement, Ashker v. Brown, supra note 200, at 7–8. 
 210 A gang member who commits murder in prison related to gang activities can still theoretically 
receive a five-year SHU sentence with two additional years in a step-down program, although in practice 
the sentences have been considerably shorter. See id. at 12. 
 211 Ashker v. Newsom, No. 09-cv-05796-CW, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13382, at *51 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
25, 2019) (finding that California’s use of confidential information to place people in the SHU 
systemically violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 212 Between December 2012 and August 2016, California’s entire solitary confinement population 
dropped from 9,870 to 3,471. California Solitary Confinement Statistics: Year One After Landmark 
Settlement, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://ccrjustice.org/california-solitary-confinement-
statistics-year-one-after-landmark-settlement [https://perma.cc/Q3LU-F4YH]; see also 60 MINUTES, 
supra note 208 (Scott Kernan discussing converting a wing of the Pelican Bay SHU into a minimum-
security unit). 
 213 Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722–23 (N.D. Ohio 2002); see also LYND, supra note 
56, at 11. 
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including a class action lawsuit challenging the overcrowding and double-
celling which was eventually dismissed by the United States Supreme 
Court.214 
In 2001, a prisoner class action lawsuit challenged conditions at Ohio’s 
Supermax Prison (OSP) and the State’s procedures for placement and 
retention there. Judge James Gwin found that 
[o]pened in 1998, the OSP is an ill-conceived legislative remedy to a problem 
that did not exist. Reacting to the horrendous April 1993 riot at the Southern 
Ohio Correctional Facility at Lucasville, the General Assembly poured huge 
amounts of state funds into OSP, Ohio’s first supermax prison. The fault of this 
plan lies in the fact that the Lucasville riot was caused by overcrowding in the 
maximum security area, not by any lack of space in the high maximum security. 
Despite a need for maximum security cells, the Ohio General Assembly built 
OSP to provide high-maximum security cells, cells for which there was little 
need.215 
The district court in Austin found that the procedures for placement and 
retention at OSP violated due process and that numerous prisoners had been 
placed and retained there inappropriately.216 It ordered new hearings, which 
resulted in a dramatic reduction in the number of prisoners housed in the 
supermax and led Ohio to convert most of the supermax into a maximum 
(not super-maximum) security facility.217 
Ohio and California’s supermax experiences illustrate that mass 
solitary, as with mass incarceration, incapacitated and isolated numerous 
 
 214 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); LYND, supra note 56, at 12–30 (describing the 
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disturbance.” LYND, supra note 56, at 23. 
 215 Order, Austin v. Wilkinson, No. 4:01-CV-71 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2005), ECF No. 624; see also 
Austin, 189 F. Supp. at 723 (noting that evidence suggested that Ohio did not need a supermax prison). 
 216 Austin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 749. 
 217 Austin v. Wilkinson, 502 F. Supp. 2d 660, 674–75 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Brief for Respondents at 
17–18 & n.5, Wilkinson v. Austin, No. 04-495, 2005 WL 556835 (Mar. 4, 2005). Ohio’s statistics 
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2019, 7:00 PM) (on file with journal). 
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people who did not warrant such isolation.218 As with mass incarceration, 
there is a tremendous reform movement even amongst prison officials who 
recognize that mass solitary has resulted in the isolation, incapacitation, 
incarceration, and essentially the discarding of thousands of people whose 
misconduct does not warrant such treatment.219 Society and the courts are 
rediscovering the lesson, apparent in the 1800s, that solitary confinement 
wreaks profound damage to a person’s psychological state,220 and modern 
neuroscience and social science have now recognized that isolation leads to 
tremendous damage to the brain and body as well.221 Moreover, as a recent 
National Academy of the Sciences landmark study on mass incarceration 
concluded, the use of supermax and other extreme forms of isolation in 
America’s prisons has “done little or nothing to reduce system-wide prison 
 
 218 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 19 (arguing that mass incarceration has led to the incarceration 
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supra note 11, at 185 (summarizing social science evidence that isolation harms the physical health of 
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147 DAEDALUS 61 (2018) (summarizing neuroscientific evidence that solitary confinement damages the 
brain). 
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disorder or disciplinary infractions.”222 As a result, courts have begun to 
impose significant restrictions on the use of solitary confinement.223 
B. Alternatives to Solitary Confinement for Violent Prisoners 
As with mass incarceration, recent judicial decisions and reform efforts 
still have not adequately addressed the problem of the very violent individual 
who most prison officials would say requires prolonged solitary confinement 
to manage. What Danielle Sered and others have pointed out in the mass 
incarceration context is relevant to the solitary confinement reform 
movement: “The current reform narrative, though compelling, has been 
based on a fallacy; that the United States can achieve large-scale 
transformative change . . . by changing responses to nonviolent offenses.”224 
Both mass incarceration and mass solitary have arisen based on a false and 
racist narrative of the violent individual: 
At the heart of that narrative is the story of an imagined monstrous other—a 
monster who is not quite human like the rest of us, who is capable of 
extraordinary harm and incapable of empathy, who inflicts great pain but does 
not feel it as we do, a monster we and our children have to be protected from at 
any price.225 
The image of this alleged monster perpetuated the rise of mass solitary 
confinement as much as, if not more, than mass incarceration itself.226 Yet, 
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prolonged solitary confinement’s extremely deleterious effects on an 
individual and its affront to human dignity constitutes torture as well as cruel 
and degrading treatment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment and 
international law.227 As torture, it should be prohibited generally, and not 
simply against those who are nonviolent or not violent enough to supposedly 
warrant such treatment. We will never end prolonged solitary confinement, 
nor recognize its true nature as torture of the body and soul, unless we 
develop alternative, humane ways of treating those few whose persistent 
violence does require some restrictions and separation from the general 
prison population. 
The 1983 Marion permanent lockdown prompted suggestions of 
alternatives to draconian isolation that were ignored and long forgotten. In 
1985, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties 
and the Administration of Justice, concerned about the conditions of solitary 
confinement at Marion, held oversight hearings into the lockdown at 
Marion.228 The subcommittee commissioned two consultants with substantial 
expertise and experience in the field of corrections, David Ward and Allen 
Breed, to investigate the situation at Marion and make recommendations 
about what to do moving forward. 
Ward and Breed’s “most important recommendation” was that the 
lockdown not be accepted as a permanent institution.229 As a long-term 
alternative for managing the highest security prisoners in the system, they 
urged the “[c]onstruction of a ‘new generation’ level 6 prison along the lines 
of the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Oak Park Heights.”230 In their 
opinion, such a prison would combine the high-tech surveillance features of 
a modern supermax with small units that would have “40–50 inmates, all in 
individual cells, contain[] dining and laundry areas, counselling offices, 
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indoor game rooms, a wire enclosed outdoor recreation yard and a work 
area.”231 The relatively small, self-contained units would “allow congregate 
activities on a unit basis.”232 In sum, while a prison in the Oak Park Heights 
model could be considered a supermax, it would not have the distinguishing 
features of a modern supermax: extreme social isolation, lack of 
environmental stimulation, and absence of physical contact. 
A study conducted by Professor Roy King of the prison conditions at 
Oak Park Heights confirmed the consultants’ observations. Prisoners were 
permitted to eat in small groups at tables if they wanted, received up to 
sixteen hours per month of contact visits, engaged in small group recreation 
and work opportunities, and had access to fifteen- or thirty-minute phone 
calls, which about 30% of the prisoners used daily.233 Had the Oak Park 
Heights model been followed by the federal government and other states, it 
might have changed the course of the supermax boom that followed.234 
Oak Park Heights, at least initially, was very secure and safe by modern 
prison standards. Remarkably, after ten years of operation, the prison had 
experienced no escape attempts or serious acts of violence, despite housing 
very dangerous prisoners serving life without parole, including about 
twenty-five to thirty prisoners who had been transferred from Marion.235 One 
former warden of Oak Park Heights attributes its success to tight security 
combined with a positive attitude towards prisoners, which allowed high-
risk prisoners out of their cells for most of the day, provided significant 
programming, and attempted to create a positive environment, unlike the 
traditional supermax.236 Former Warden Bruton wrote in 2004 that after 
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twenty years of operation there had not been a homicide or escape, nor were 
drugs or homemade weapons rife at Oak Park Heights.237 
Of course, the prison was never problem free, and conditions may have 
become far worse since its first decade of existence. Today, it has a draconian 
disciplinary segregation unit holding fifty-two prisoners in what can for 
some be very prolonged solitary. Offenders who do not follow the rules are 
sometimes threatened with transfer to isolation in the federal system, and 
physical contact with visitors has been severely limited.238 Moreover, there 
has recently been a spike in violence at the prison, with instances of assault 
on staff and prisoners rising.239 Yet, Oak Park Heights’s practices, at least in 
its beginnings, of confining dangerous prisoners in high security, but not 
isolating, conditions serves as a potential alternative to the prolonged solitary 
confinement of modern supermax confinement. 
The Federal Bureau of Prisons rejected Ward and Breed’s suggestion. 
Initially, the BOP decided it did not need a new supermax prison, noting that 
the number of prisoners needing such high security was not increasing. The 
BOP concluded it would be a more efficient use of limited resources to 
construct “additional medium security facilities” to “reduce the overall level 
of crowding” than to put resources into a supermax for a “small number of 
inmates.”240 Nonetheless, within a few years, the BOP reversed course, and 
decided that it did, after all, need a supermax.241 But instead of revisiting the 
model that Ward and Breed suggested242—a high security, tightly controlled 
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prison, which nonetheless allowed for group recreation in small units, 
congregate meals, work opportunities, phone calls, and contact visits with 
family and friends—the BOP constructed a new, more draconian version of 
the Marion lockdown model, the ADX Supermax at Florence.243 
As public opinion, judicial decisions, and prison administrators have 
reevaluated the use of prolonged solitary confinement in American prisons, 
there has been increased interest in a model of segregating dangerous 
prisoners without isolation, such as the one that Oak Park Heights initially 
presented. Former Colorado Department of Corrections Director Rick 
Raemisch has led the way in imagining and implementing alternative 
approaches, even for the very violent prisoner, as has Director Leann Bertsch 
in North Dakota.244 Raemisch eliminated mass prolonged solitary 
confinement in Colorado and set up alternative units relying on small-group, 
congregate activities to house dangerous prisoners.245 Some European 
nations have also developed alternatives that segregate high-risk prisoners 
without the harsh social isolation found in American supermax prisons. In 
Scotland, England, and Wales, for example, dangerous prisoners are 
confined away from the general population, but in small groups rather than 
total isolation.246 There they are provided direct-contact family and legal 
visits and telephone calls, as well as “access to education, gym facilities, 
payment for work, association with other prisoners, and in-cell activities.”247 
Perhaps even more striking is the prison at Grendon in England, which 
houses some of the most “damaged, disturbed and dangerous” prisoners in 
the English prison system.248 Despite its difficult population, Grendon 
provides small-group therapy and daily community meetings and has 
produced, in the words of its governor, “extraordinary outcomes.”249 
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Integral to the separation-without-isolation model is a humane approach 
to prison management. As numerous prison experts pointed out at the time 
and continue to urge, the violence and disturbances at Marion and other 
prisons in the 1970s and ’80s were undoubtedly at least in part brought on 
by inhumane, hostile prison management which did not recognize or 
adequately respond to legitimate grievances.250 The ACLU and other prison 
experts testified before the Congressional Committee and before the courts 
that the practices of the prison officials both before and during the lockdown 
should be evaluated to determine whether “the errors or weaknesses in the 
prison administration . . . created a climate for the occurrence of violence or 
which exacerbated the violent confrontation.”251 As numerous correctional 
officials have recognized, treating prisoners humanely and responding to 
legitimate grievances are key mechanisms in tamping down violence in 
prisons.252 The court in Bruscino nevertheless categorically rejected any 
notion that changing prison administration practices would at least help 
reduce the violence at Marion and other prisons.253 And neither the BOP nor 
Congress ever undertook any investigation into whether prison management 
practices either led to or failed to prevent the violence that occurred at 
Marion in 1983. 
Once we remove the thousands of nonviolent or mentally ill prisoners 
from supermaxes and other prolonged solitary units, it will be possible to 
develop more positive, intensive programs incorporating social interaction 
to house those who truly do require some separation from the general prison 
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population. And authorities should rediscover the Oak Park Heights model 
as constructed by “model warden” Frank Wood in the 1980s as an alternative 
to the modern supermax, even for very dangerous prisoners.254 As 
congressional consultant David Ward put it, “The challenge for the Bureau 
of Prisons, as we tried to emphasize in our report, is to try to do something 
positive even with those problematic individuals under these very special 
circumstances.”255 At the heart of ending both mass incarceration and 
prolonged solitary confinement lies the quest to treating even very violent 
people in a “positive,” humane way. This will preserve their human dignity 
and reflect the rehabilitative goals of punishment which are inherent in the 
value that even those who have committed terrible acts are capable of 
redemption and change.256 
The conditions at modern supermaxes reflect a mission not of 
protecting against violence, but of exercising absolute control over prisoners, 
a goal that is facilitated by debilitating prisoners’ psychological states. The 
first step towards an alternative to the mass use of solitary is to separate 
punitive control from legitimate security functions. From a security 
perspective, it is difficult to perceive any benefit to providing small, enclosed 
recreation areas without equipment, windowless cells, and no phone calls 
with family and friends, as was the case at Pelican Bay SHU.257 The absolute 
deprivation of reading materials, affirmed by the Supreme Court in Beard v. 
Banks as “logical,”258 serves no serious security goal, nor does the 
widespread censorship of books and materials,259 nor the prohibition of 
media interviews. In contrast, “positive” security, which involves the kind of 
engaged staff–prisoner interactions banished from the supermax, can be 
combined with small-group social interaction to provide human contact, 
even for very dangerous prisoners.260 
Perhaps most fundamentally, a recognition that the rise of the supermax 
was undergirded by a perceived need to exercise total control over prisoners 
deemed disruptive requires that reforms accord even allegedly dangerous 
 
 254 See BARTOLLAS, supra note 236. 
 255 WARD & BREED, supra note 74, at 48. 
 256 See, e.g., BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY (2014). 
 257 See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 899 F. Supp. 1146, 1266 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“[S]ubjecting individuals 
to conditions that are ‘very likely’ to render them psychotic or otherwise inflict a serious mental illness 
or seriously exacerbate an existing mental illness [cannot] be squared with evolving standards of 
humanity or decency, especially when certain aspects of those conditions appear to bear little relation to 
security concerns.”). 
 258 548 U.S. 521, 531–32 (2006). 
 259 See RACHAEL KAMEL & BONNIE KERNESS, THE PRISON INSIDE THE PRISON: CONTROL UNITS, 
SUPERMAX PRISONS, AND DEVICES OF TORTURE 2 (2003), https://www.afsc.org/sites/default/ 
files/documents/PrisonInsideThePrison.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA7J-SR32]. 
 260 See Expert Report of Dr. Andrew Coyle, supra note 246, at 17. 
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prisoners with some ability to dialogue with officials over the conditions 
under which they live and challenge unjust policies. In the California 
litigation that ended indeterminate solitary confinement in that state, the 
most difficult aspect of the settlement was not resolving disputes over the 
substantive policies that the State would henceforth implement, but rather 
plaintiffs’ insistence that CDCR officials should meet with their 
representatives on a quarterly basis to discuss the implementation of the 
settlement decree. Those officials were willing to meet with plaintiffs’ 
lawyers but not with the plaintiffs themselves, perhaps believing that to do 
so would accord prisoner representatives legitimacy and undermine 
officials’ total control. Eventually it required mediation by the federal judge 
overseeing the process to get CDCR to accept a compromise of semiannual 
meetings between CDCR officials and prisoner representatives.261 When 
those meetings occurred after the Agreement was implemented, CDCR 
officials often refused to even engage in a dialogue with the prisoner 
representatives.262 Yet the challenge of according individuals confined in 
high-security units some collective control over their circumstances and the 
conditions of their confinement is critical to restoring human dignity and 
hope to those who suffered through years of solitary confinement. 
CONCLUSION 
The current reform movement to end prolonged solitary confinement 
has two major tasks. The first is to demonstrate the risk of harm the draconian 
practice imposes on those prisoners subjected to it. In the last decade, our 
understanding of the harm wrought by solitary confinement has been 
deepened by the work of social scientists who have shown that loneliness 
and social isolation are as great a risk factor for a number of serious physical 
conditions, such as hypertension, heart attacks, and strokes, as smoking or 
obesity.263 The work of neuroscientists has also established that solitary 
confinement harms the human brain. 
 
 261 See Settlement Agreement, Ashker v. Brown, supra note 200, ¶ 49 (“Defendants shall meet with 
Plaintiffs’ counsel and the four inmate representatives semiannually to discuss progress with 
implementation of this Agreement.”). 
 262 Letter from Jules Lobel to Judge Vadas (Dec. 2, 2016) (on file with journal). 
 263 See Expert Report of Louise C. Hawkley at 4–8, Ashker v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW (Mar. 
12, 2015) (discussing health effects of social isolation); Hawkley, supra note 221, at 185–98 
(summarizing social science evidence that isolation harms the physical health of the individual); Julianne 
Holt-Lunstad, Timothy B. Smith & J. Bradley Layton, Social Relationships and Mortality Risk: A Meta-
Analytic Review, 7 PLOS MED., no. 7, 2010, at 14–15, available at 
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1000316 
[https://perma.cc/SKX4-6KXW] (finding correlation between social interaction and mortality that is 
comparable to other health risks). 
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The second task is to overcome the mythology of the violent predator, 
for whom prison officials have no alternative but to confine in draconian 
isolation from other inmates, staff, and even families and friends. This Essay 
has focused on that task. It has demonstrated that mass solitary in this country 
developed not in response to that violent predator, but rather as a means for 
officials to achieve control of political activists and “troublemakers” 
amongst prisoners. Moreover, most prisoners caught up in the solitary 
dragnet could be safely managed in well-run general population units instead 
of warehoused in modern supermaxes. Finally, there is an alternative to the 
modern supermax for those few who cannot be safely managed in general 
population: separation without isolation. 
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